You are using an outdated browser and your browsing experience will not be optimal. Please update to the latest version of Microsoft Edge, Google Chrome or Mozilla Firefox. Install Microsoft Edge

May 6, 2025

Key Findings from OECD Review of Thailand’s Competition Law

Subscribe to Updates

On May 2, 2025, the Trade Competition Commission of Thailand (TCCT), in cooperation with the OECD, held a conference to discuss the results of the OECD Peer Review of Thailand’s competition law and policy. This review, conducted under the second phase of the OECD-Thailand Country Program, marks a significant milestone in Thailand’s ongoing institutional reform. Tilleke & Gibbins’ trade competition experts were invited to participate in both the program and the conference.

The OECD Peer Review aimed to assess the current state of Thailand’s legal and regulatory environment surrounding competition law and policies, pinpoint strengths and weaknesses, and offer recommendations on potential future development. This article highlights the review’s key findings and recommendations, and their implications for businesses operating in Thailand.

Institutional Framework: Room for Improvement

Competition law in Thailand has undergone significant transformation, particularly since the enactment of the Trade Competition Act B.E. 2560 (2017) (TCA). This landmark legislation aimed to revolutionize the competition regime, notably by amending important legal provisions to enhance public enforcement capabilities and establishing the TCCT as an independent authority separate from government ministries, endowed with its own budget and powers to enforce competition law across key areas: anticompetitive agreements, abuse of dominant market positions, merger control, and unfair trade practices. The goal was to create a more efficient, flexible, and independent agency and to prevent political intervention.

However, the OECD Peer Review points out a major impediment. The TCCT faces considerable budget and human resource constraints, which may impact its enforcement capacity. Its budget is comparatively low by international and regional standards, and only a fraction of its staff is dedicated to core competition enforcement (merger control and anticompetitive behavior). Furthermore, there is room for the TCCT to continue its improvements in expertise and efficiency—areas the TCCT has been attempting to shore up in recent years.

Scope of Application: Key Exclusions

A critical aspect noted by the OECD is the TCA’s scope of application, which contains broad exemptions in relation to the following areas:

  • State-owned enterprises (SOEs): While the 2017 TCA aimed to reduce the scope of exemptions for SOEs, SOEs remain predominantly outside the TCA’s reach if their undertakings relate to national security, public interest, public utilities, or societal interests based on law or cabinet resolutions. In practice, the TCCT appears to consider most SOEs exempt, even when competing with private players, which can create an uneven playing field.
  • Regulated sectors: Businesses specifically regulated by other sectoral laws with jurisdiction over competition matters (like telecommunications, energy, banking, and insurance) are excluded from the TCA. However, the competition rules and enforcement powers within these sectoral laws vary substantially, leading to a fragmented landscape and potential enforcement gaps. Clarity is needed on jurisdictional boundaries, especially in cross-sector cases, and the principle of competitive neutrality should be observed.
  • Extraterritoriality: It remains unclear whether the TCA applies to anticompetitive conduct occurring outside Thailand but having effects within the country. The current interpretation seems to limit enforcement against foreign entities without a Thai presence, potentially leaving international cartels or foreign mergers affecting the Thai market unaddressed.

Enforcement: Obstacles and Need for Reforms

Competition enforcement in Thailand is still developing, and the past seven years saw a low number of enforcement cases reported to the public. The OECD Peer Review Report outlines the following challenges:

  • Standard of proof: Hardcore cartels (with agreements on price-fixing, output restrictions, market allocation, or bid rigging) and abuse of dominance are exclusively criminal offenses. This requires a very high standard of proof (“beyond reasonable doubt”), making successful prosecution difficult. Most jurisdictions make administrative tools available for competition authorities to impose fines on infringements.
  • Rule of reason for cartels: Even hardcore cartels are assessed under a rule of reason, requiring proof of market effects and potentially exempting collusion with a combined market share of below 10%. This contrasts with the standard international practice of treating hardcore cartels as per se (inherently) illegal.
  • Bid rigging: Ambiguity exists regarding jurisdiction over bid rigging in public procurement. In Thailand, the National Anti-Corruption Commission typically has jurisdiction over public procurement in regard to anticorruption concerns, potentially leaving a gap in competition-focused enforcement.
  • Abuse of dominance: The assessment focuses more on the “unfairness” or “unreasonableness” of conduct rather than its impact on competition. Determining dominance itself relies heavily on market share and revenue thresholds, potentially overlooking other market power indicators.
  • Detection: Enforcement hinges primarily on complaints filed by business operators or any third party. A leniency program or whistleblower protections have not been formally introduced, but both tools are crucial for cartel detection globally.
  • Transparency: The TCCT generally does not publish a full version of their decisions but only brief summaries. This may hinder legal certainty, deterrence, and public understanding.

Merger Control: A Complex Dual System

Thailand operates a two-tiered merger control system:

  1. Premerger (ex-ante) approval: Required for mergers that may cause a monopoly or result in a dominant position. The TCCT can approve, approve with remedies, or prohibit these mergers.
  2. Postmerger (ex-post) notification: Required within seven days post-completion for mergers that may substantially reduce competition but do not fulfill the ex-ante criteria. The TCCT has no power to intervene (impose remedies or prohibit) in these notified mergers, even if anticompetitive concerns may be found.

Major issues with this two-tiered system identified by the OECD include:

  • Ineffective ex-post system: The inability to act on an ex-post notification may weaken enforcement on merger deals that presage competition restraint from the outset.
  • Unclear thresholds: Notification thresholds are linked to the potential competitive effect (monopoly, dominance, substantial lessening of competition), requiring complex analysis before notification and creating uncertainty. Clearer, objective criteria (such as turnover, potentially with a local nexus) are recommended.
  • Possibly high thresholds: The relatively low number of ex-ante filings (only 12 from 2017 to 2023) suggests current thresholds might be too high, potentially allowing anticompetitive deals to escape review.
  • Substantive test: The assessment appears focused on market structure (creation of dominance) rather than a broader “substantial lessening of competition” test used in many jurisdictions.
  • Procedure: Lack of third-party participation rights, potentially short review timelines for complex cases, and limited transparency regarding decisions are concerns.

Principal OECD Recommendations

The OECD Peer Review provides numerous recommendations, including:

  • Scope: Apply competition law consistently to SOEs engaged in economic activities and clarify jurisdiction in regulated sectors. Ensure extraterritorial application.
  • Resources and structure: Increase the TCCT budget and enforcement members of staff. Reconsider the role of external inquiry subcommittees.
  • Transparency and fairness: Publish decisions consisting of facts, legal basis, and penalties while protecting legitimate confidentiality. Improve procedural rules and rights of defense.
  • Enforcement: Empower the TCCT to impose administrative sanctions against hardcore cartels and abuse of dominance. Consider hardcore cartels inherently illegal. Clarify bid-rigging jurisdiction. Focus assessment of abuse of dominance on competitive impact. Introduce leniency/whistleblower programs.
  • Merger control: Streamline the regime (potentially removing the ex-post system or giving the TCCT powers within it). Adopt clear, objective notification thresholds, potentially lower them, and add a local nexus. Allow concerned parties to be involved in each stage of review and third-party input. Introduce a simplified procedure for a transaction that does not cause significant competition concerns (e.g., no horizontal overlaps or vertical relationships between the concerned parties, meeting criteria for combined market shares).

While Thailand made strides in the application and enforcement of competition law upon the enactment of the 2017 TCA, the OECD Peer Review underlines significant challenges that need to be addressed. An implementation of the OECD’s recommendations will be crucial for fostering a truly competitive environment that benefits businesses and consumers alike. For businesses having an operation in Thailand regardless of having a physical presence, understanding these ongoing developments and potential reforms is vital for navigating the competition law landscape effectively.

Related Professionals

Practices

Antitrust and Competition

Customs and International Trade

Location

RELATED INSIGHTS​ 

May 8, 2026
The global trade environment for Thai exporters in 2026 has shifted significantly. Recent enforcement developments in both the United States and the European Union show a clear shift in trade policy: regulators are no longer focused solely on tariff levels, but also on whether products genuinely originate where exporters claim they do. Adding to this complexity, the US Supreme Court’s February 2026 decision striking down the use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose tariffs has upended the legal basis for a major pillar of US tariff policy, creating significant legal and commercial uncertainty for exporters worldwide, including in Thailand. For Thai companies integrated into regional supply chains, this change carries material implications. Although the IEEPA-based US reciprocal tariffs have been struck down, intensified circumvention enforcement continues under separate legal authorities, and the administration has signaled its intent to reimpose tariffs under alternative statutory frameworks, while EU authorities are using anti-circumvention investigations where trade patterns shift. In both jurisdictions, the decisive issue is whether manufacturing in Thailand constitutes substantial transformation under applicable rules of origin. Such origin determinations increasingly drive duty exposure, audit risk and commercial disputes. In 2026, the ability to defend a product’s Thai origin is not merely a procedural step, it is central to preserving market access in the US and EU. Impact Of US Circumvention Enforcement and an Uncertain Tariff Landscape Following the 2025 Framework for an Agreement on Reciprocal Trade, Thailand saw a shift in its tariff relationship with the US. A substantial range of Thai-origin goods were subject to a 19% reciprocal tariff under the IEEPA. However, the Supreme Court’s ruling invalidating the use of IEEPA for tariffs has removed the legal basis for that rate. The Administration has indicated it intends to pursue replacement tariffs under other statutory authorities,
Read More
April 15, 2026
On March 31, 2026, Vietnam’s government issued Decree 102/2026/ND-CP (Decree 102), which amends Decree 75/2019/ND-CP on administrative sanctions for competition law violations (Decree 75). Effective from May 20, 2026, the new decree introduces a number of significant changes aimed at strengthening enforcement, revising penalty structures, and broadening the range of remedial measures, primarily for violations related to economic concentration. Revised Penalties for Economic Concentration Violations Decree 102 significantly revises the penalties for violations related to economic concentration. Failure to notify an economic concentration; implementing an economic concentration before clearance Under the new framework, Articles 14 and 15 of Decree 75 have been amended to impose a range of monetary fines, rather than relying solely on percentage‑based penalties as under the previous regime, for violations involving the failure to notify an economic concentration or the implementation of an economic concentration prior to clearance. The fines range from VND 500 million to VND 1 billion for each enterprise participating in a concentration with combined assets, revenues, or purchase value below VND 3,000 billion in the preceding fiscal year, capped at 5% of the violating enterprise’s total turnover in the relevant market. For concentrations meeting or exceeding the VND 3,000 billion threshold across those same metrics, the fines increase to VND 1 billion to VND 2 billion per enterprise, also subject to the 5% cap. These differentiated thresholds allow penalties to better reflect the size of the transaction and its potential competitive impact. Non-compliance with conditional approvals Enterprises that do not implement or only partially implement the conditions specified in a conditional economic concentration approval decision face fines ranging from 1% to 3% of total turnover in the relevant market during the fiscal year preceding the violation. Decree 102 also adds a new remedial measure requiring enterprises to fully implement all conditions
Read More
April 9, 2026
In March 2026, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) initiated two significant investigations under Section 301(b) of the Trade Act of 1974 that directly affect Thailand. The first investigation examines overproduction in manufacturing sectors caused by government support or policies that distort normal market conditions across 16 economies, including Thailand. The second investigation, launched the following day, targets 60 economies, also including Thailand, for alleged failures to impose and effectively enforce prohibitions on the importation of goods produced with forced labor. Taken together, these investigations represent a significant escalation in US trade enforcement and create substantial risk for Thai exporters, manufacturers, and businesses with supply chain connections to the United States. The investigations are moving on an accelerated timeline, with the USTR indicating that potential trade measures, including tariffs, could be imposed as early as July 2026. This article provides an overview of the investigations, highlights their specific implications for Thailand, and outlines practical considerations for affected businesses. Section 301 as a Trade Enforcement Tool Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 gives the USTR authority to investigate foreign acts, policies, or practices that are considered unreasonable or discriminatory and that burden or restrict US commerce. If the USTR concludes that such practices exist, the statute allows a wide range of remedial measures, including the imposition of tariffs, nontariff trade restrictions, and negotiated agreements with foreign governments. Unlike other trade authorities, Section 301 does not set limits on the level of tariffs or the duration of measures, giving the USTR considerable flexibility to address perceived trade imbalances or unfair practices. Historically, Section 301 investigations take up to a year to complete. In this instance, however, the USTR has indicated that the investigations will proceed on a much faster timetable, with an unofficial target of concluding by July 2026.
Read More
April 1, 2026
On March 30, 2026, Thailand’s Customs Department announced a strategy to raise import duties on a broad range of consumer goods—including plastic items and electronics accessories—to their maximum statutory ceilings, which often sit at 30% or 40%. Many of these goods currently benefit from promotional or incentive rates as low as 5%. For importers, e-commerce platforms, and logistics providers, this development demands immediate attention. While these increases generally require cabinet approval, they do not require full parliamentary amendment of the Customs Tariff Decree B.E. 2530, as the Customs director-general and the finance minister hold delegated authority to adjust rates within existing statutory bounds. Businesses should not assume that the legislative process will provide significant lead time before higher rates take effect. Death of the De Minimis: Abolishing the THB 1,500 Loophole This “ceiling-rate” policy, which is designed to equalize the landed cost of foreign goods with the domestic production costs of Thai manufacturers, builds on a sweeping set of customs reforms that have already begun to reshape Thailand’s trade environment. The foundation of this new regime was laid on January 1, 2026, when Thailand formally abolished the longstanding THB 1,500 duty exemption for small imported parcels under Customs Notification No. 219/2568. Every imported item is now subject to VAT and applicable import duties for its declared value, regardless of parcel size or transaction amount. By narrowing the scope of exemptions previously granted to low-value goods under the Customs Tariff Decree B.E. 2530, the government has made clear that the era of tax-free cross-border micro-imports is over. Three-Phased Strategy and Legal Modernization The March 30 announcement is the second phase of a three-part regulatory roadmap: Immediate enforcement: The removal of the THB 1,500 loophole and the imposition of VAT on all parcels, effective January 1, 2026. Tariff realignment: The current
Read More