You are using an outdated browser and your browsing experience will not be optimal. Please update to the latest version of Microsoft Edge, Google Chrome or Mozilla Firefox. Install Microsoft Edge

April 15, 2026

Vietnam Tightens Competition Enforcement With Revised Sanctions Framework

On March 31, 2026, Vietnam’s government issued Decree 102/2026/ND-CP (Decree 102), which amends Decree 75/2019/ND-CP on administrative sanctions for competition law violations (Decree 75). Effective from May 20, 2026, the new decree introduces a number of significant changes aimed at strengthening enforcement, revising penalty structures, and broadening the range of remedial measures, primarily for violations related to economic concentration.

Revised Penalties for Economic Concentration Violations

Decree 102 significantly revises the penalties for violations related to economic concentration.

Failure to notify an economic concentration; implementing an economic concentration before clearance

Under the new framework, Articles 14 and 15 of Decree 75 have been amended to impose a range of monetary fines, rather than relying solely on percentage‑based penalties as under the previous regime, for violations involving the failure to notify an economic concentration or the implementation of an economic concentration prior to clearance.

The fines range from VND 500 million to VND 1 billion for each enterprise participating in a concentration with combined assets, revenues, or purchase value below VND 3,000 billion in the preceding fiscal year, capped at 5% of the violating enterprise’s total turnover in the relevant market.

For concentrations meeting or exceeding the VND 3,000 billion threshold across those same metrics, the fines increase to VND 1 billion to VND 2 billion per enterprise, also subject to the 5% cap. These differentiated thresholds allow penalties to better reflect the size of the transaction and its potential competitive impact.

Non-compliance with conditional approvals

Enterprises that do not implement or only partially implement the conditions specified in a conditional economic concentration approval decision face fines ranging from 1% to 3% of total turnover in the relevant market during the fiscal year preceding the violation.

Decree 102 also adds a new remedial measure requiring enterprises to fully implement all conditions specified in conditional economic concentration approval decisions under Article 41.1(b) of the Competition Law.

Implementing a prohibited concentration

Decree 102 raises the fines from the former range of 1% to 3% to 1% to 5% of relevant market turnover on enterprises that proceed with a concentration after the Vietnam Competition Commission (VCC) has prohibited it under Article 41.1(c) of the Competition Law.

In addition to monetary fines, implementing a prohibited concentration may trigger structural and behavioral remedies, including forced divestiture (sale of all or part of the acquired shares/assets or splitting up merged/combined entities), and imposition of state control over prices and other key contractual terms of the post‑transaction entity.

Fixed fine for low nexus transactions

In addition to the zero-turnover scenario already recognized under Decree 75, Decree 102 introduces a second case for fixed fines ranging from VND 100 million to VND 200 million. This fixed-fine approach applies where the enterprises participating in an economic concentration (i) do not operate in the same relevant market, (ii) do not operate at different stages of the same production, distribution, or supply chain for a specific product or service, and (iii) do not have business lines that constitute inputs to, or are complementary to, one another.

This approach ensures an appropriate deterrent effect while avoiding the mechanical application of turnover-based penalties in cases where there is little or no relevant market turnover, or where the competitive relationship between the parties is highly indirect.

Authority to Revoke Merger Notifications and Approvals

A significant procedural change empowers the VCC to revoke notifications of completeness, preliminary review results, or economic concentration decisions if it discovers that a filing party provided false, misleading, or incomplete information, concealed or destroyed relevant documents, or coerced others to provide false information. This revocation authority operates as both an enforcement tool and a deterrent, signaling that the VCC will not hesitate to unwind approvals tainted by dishonest submissions.

Additionally, the decree clarifies that authorities may now compel enterprises to provide complete and truthful information and documents as part of remediation efforts. These expanded measures give regulators greater leverage to ensure post-merger compliance with conditions designed to preserve market competition. Enterprises should ensure that all information provided during the notification and review process is accurate, complete, and verifiable.

Removal of Certain Supplementary Penalties

Decree 102 eliminates several supplementary penalties that previously applied to specific violations, including the penalty of revoking business registration certificates for enterprises formed through prohibited mergers or joint ventures. It also eliminates certain provisions that previously allowed for warning penalties or specific enforcement actions related to violations of other competition law provisions. These changes streamline the penalty framework and remove certain overlapping or redundant sanctions.

Digital Handling of Competition Sanctions

Article 33a adds an “electronic layer” to the competition enforcement framework. In substance it does not create any new types of infringements or new fine levels, but instead brings competition cases (including issuance and receipt of administrative sanctioning decisions) into compliance with the general regime on handling administrative violations in the electronic environment under Decree 118/2021 (as amended by Decrees 68/2025 and 190/2025).

For businesses, this paves the way for (i) interacting with the competition authority and receiving sanction decisions and procedural documents via electronic means with the same legal effect as paper service, which may shorten response and appeal timelines; and (ii) enhanced monitoring and enforcement of competition infringements committed online.

Companies should therefore ensure their internal processes cover how they receive, process and respond to competition authority communications electronically, not only in hard copy.

RELATED INSIGHTS​ 

August 21, 2025
On August 19, 2025, the Trade Competition Commission of Thailand (TCCT) released its draft Guidelines on the Consideration of Unfair Trade Practices and Conduct Constituting Monopoly, Reducing Competition, or Restricting Competition in Multi-Sided Platform Businesses in the Category of Digital Platforms for the Sale of Goods or Services (E-commerce). A public comment period on the guidelines is open until September 18. The draft provides the first detailed framework for how the TCCT will interpret and enforce the substantive provisions under the Trade Competition Act against digital platforms, which have a unique network effect and require complex competition analysis. This development will profoundly impact the operations of e-commerce platforms, sellers, and associated service providers in Thailand. The guidelines primarily target e-commerce digital platform business operators, which are defined as follows: E-commerce digital platform: A medium facilitating the sale, purchase, or exchange of goods or services, including any operations to create transactions or interactions between business operators via an electronic transaction system, regardless of whether service fees are charged. E-commerce digital platform business operator: A service provider of a digital platform for the sale of goods or services who acts as an intermediary facilitating the sale of goods or services, including any operations to create transactions or interactions through an electronic transaction system by receiving orders for goods or services transacted via an electronic system, whether in the form of an e-marketplace, a social marketplace, or any other form that connects purchase orders for goods or services with business operators through an electronic system. Prohibited Conduct The guidelines classify potentially anticompetitive conduct and unfair trade practices into two categories: price-related and non-price-related conduct. 1. Price-related conduct The TCCT is targeting pricing strategies that can harm competition. Key prohibited behaviors include: Price below cost: Setting prices below the average total cost without
August 19, 2025
On August 6, 2025, Myanmar’s National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) issued Order No. 20/2025, announcing a change in the composition of the country’s Foreign Exchange Supervisory Committee (FESC). The prime minister has been appointed committee chair of the FESC, and five other individuals were appointed to the committee. The order took immediate effect. Originally established in April 2022, the FESC is responsible for approving foreign currency conversion, granting exemptions to foreign exchange restrictions, and permitting overseas transfers of foreign currency. The FESC supervises the flow of foreign currencies for domestic and foreign investment, manufacturing, exports and imports, and service businesses (including education- and health-related initiatives). The FESC is specifically responsible for considering and approving the use of foreign currency for the following: Importing machinery, vehicles, equipment, and raw materials essential for foreign investment and manufacturing projects; Importing fuel, medicine, cooking oil, fertilizer, insecticide, and construction materials not readily available on the domestic market; Covering Myanmar citizens’ needs abroad, such as medical treatment, education, or religious activities; Facilitating imports of general goods, loan repayments, interest payments to foreign lenders, service payments, and profit repatriation from investments; and Importing luxury products, including brand-name goods, jewelry, sports cars, and watches. The FESC is empowered to carry out further duties related to foreign exchange management as assigned by the NDSC Importers, exporters, investors, and business owners are encouraged to consult the most current FESC guidelines and approval lists before conducting transactions in Myanmar. For more details on these FESC composition developments, or on any aspect of financial regulations in Myanmar, please contact Tilleke & Gibbins at [email protected].
August 1, 2025
Tilleke & Gibbins has contributed the Vietnam chapter to Corporate Governance 2025, part of the International Comparative Legal Guides (ICLG) series published by Global Legal Group. This respected guide offers comprehensive, jurisdiction-specific overviews of corporate governance laws and practices around the world. Each jurisdictional chapter follows a clear Q&A format, providing practical insights into critical issues such as: Sources of corporate governance regulation Shareholders’ rights, powers, and responsibilities Structure and duties of management bodies Stakeholder involvement in governance Transparency and reporting requirements ESG and sustainability-related obligations Cybersecurity and technology-related disclosures The Vietnam chapter was authored by Tram Ngoc Bich Nguyen, Truc Thi Thanh Tran, Dung Thi Phuong Le, and Quang Minh Vu, members of Tilleke & Gibbins’ corporate and commercial team in Ho Chi Minh City. The authors provide detailed analysis of Vietnam’s corporate governance framework, including recent developments such as the 2025 amendments to the Law on Enterprises requiring disclosure of ultimate beneficial ownership and the increasing emphasis on sustainable business practices and responsible corporate conduct. The chapter also discusses practical considerations for foreign investors in Vietnam, such as overlapping signing authorities between key company officers, enforcement of shareholders’ agreements, and disclosure obligations related to ownership and management roles. The complete Vietnam chapter is available as a PDF below. The Vietnam chapter—and the full Corporate Governance 2025 guide—are also freely available on the ICLG website.
July 25, 2025
On June 17, 2025, the National Assembly of Vietnam adopted Law No. 76/2025/QH15 (Amended LOE) amending and supplementing the 2020 Law on Enterprises, which aims to reshape the legal framework to enhance transparency and alignment with international standards. The Amended LOE took effect from July 1, 2025. Below are key notes on the Amended LOE. Recognition of Beneficial Owners The beneficial owner (BO) concept was previously addressed under Vietnam’s anti-money laundering framework. However, the formal recognition of a BO in the Amended LOE marks a pivotal advancement in embedding ownership transparency into corporate governance, in line with the G7 Financial Action Task Force’s standards on anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing. Under the Amended LOE and Decree No. 168/2025/ND-CP of the government dated June 30, 2025, on enterprise registration (Decree 168), a BO is identified through either equity ownership or control rights. Equity ownership: Individuals holding 25% or more of a company’s charter capital or voting shares, either directly or indirectly, qualify as BOs. Indirect ownership is further defined as ownership of at least 25% of charter capital or voting shares through an intermediary organization. Control rights: Individuals with the authority to make or influence major decisions are considered BOs. The actual control over a company includes the power (i) to appoint or remove most or all members of the board of directors or the members’ council or the general director of a company; (ii) to amend the charter; or (iii) to decide other key matters specified in the company’s charter. Notably, individuals representing state ownership in state-owned enterprises are excluded from the scope of the BO concept. Companies are responsible for collecting, updating, and retaining information about BOs and cooperating with authorities when requested to identify BOs, among other obligations. Additionally, any companies registered before July 1, 2025, must