You are using an outdated browser and your browsing experience will not be optimal. Please update to the latest version of Microsoft Edge, Google Chrome or Mozilla Firefox. Install Microsoft Edge

April 15, 2026

Vietnam Tightens Competition Enforcement With Revised Sanctions Framework

On March 31, 2026, Vietnam’s government issued Decree 102/2026/ND-CP (Decree 102), which amends Decree 75/2019/ND-CP on administrative sanctions for competition law violations (Decree 75). Effective from May 20, 2026, the new decree introduces a number of significant changes aimed at strengthening enforcement, revising penalty structures, and broadening the range of remedial measures, primarily for violations related to economic concentration.

Revised Penalties for Economic Concentration Violations

Decree 102 significantly revises the penalties for violations related to economic concentration.

Failure to notify an economic concentration; implementing an economic concentration before clearance

Under the new framework, Articles 14 and 15 of Decree 75 have been amended to impose a range of monetary fines, rather than relying solely on percentage‑based penalties as under the previous regime, for violations involving the failure to notify an economic concentration or the implementation of an economic concentration prior to clearance.

The fines range from VND 500 million to VND 1 billion for each enterprise participating in a concentration with combined assets, revenues, or purchase value below VND 3,000 billion in the preceding fiscal year, capped at 5% of the violating enterprise’s total turnover in the relevant market.

For concentrations meeting or exceeding the VND 3,000 billion threshold across those same metrics, the fines increase to VND 1 billion to VND 2 billion per enterprise, also subject to the 5% cap. These differentiated thresholds allow penalties to better reflect the size of the transaction and its potential competitive impact.

Non-compliance with conditional approvals

Enterprises that do not implement or only partially implement the conditions specified in a conditional economic concentration approval decision face fines ranging from 1% to 3% of total turnover in the relevant market during the fiscal year preceding the violation.

Decree 102 also adds a new remedial measure requiring enterprises to fully implement all conditions specified in conditional economic concentration approval decisions under Article 41.1(b) of the Competition Law.

Implementing a prohibited concentration

Decree 102 raises the fines from the former range of 1% to 3% to 1% to 5% of relevant market turnover on enterprises that proceed with a concentration after the Vietnam Competition Commission (VCC) has prohibited it under Article 41.1(c) of the Competition Law.

In addition to monetary fines, implementing a prohibited concentration may trigger structural and behavioral remedies, including forced divestiture (sale of all or part of the acquired shares/assets or splitting up merged/combined entities), and imposition of state control over prices and other key contractual terms of the post‑transaction entity.

Fixed fine for low nexus transactions

In addition to the zero-turnover scenario already recognized under Decree 75, Decree 102 introduces a second case for fixed fines ranging from VND 100 million to VND 200 million. This fixed-fine approach applies where the enterprises participating in an economic concentration (i) do not operate in the same relevant market, (ii) do not operate at different stages of the same production, distribution, or supply chain for a specific product or service, and (iii) do not have business lines that constitute inputs to, or are complementary to, one another.

This approach ensures an appropriate deterrent effect while avoiding the mechanical application of turnover-based penalties in cases where there is little or no relevant market turnover, or where the competitive relationship between the parties is highly indirect.

Authority to Revoke Merger Notifications and Approvals

A significant procedural change empowers the VCC to revoke notifications of completeness, preliminary review results, or economic concentration decisions if it discovers that a filing party provided false, misleading, or incomplete information, concealed or destroyed relevant documents, or coerced others to provide false information. This revocation authority operates as both an enforcement tool and a deterrent, signaling that the VCC will not hesitate to unwind approvals tainted by dishonest submissions.

Additionally, the decree clarifies that authorities may now compel enterprises to provide complete and truthful information and documents as part of remediation efforts. These expanded measures give regulators greater leverage to ensure post-merger compliance with conditions designed to preserve market competition. Enterprises should ensure that all information provided during the notification and review process is accurate, complete, and verifiable.

Removal of Certain Supplementary Penalties

Decree 102 eliminates several supplementary penalties that previously applied to specific violations, including the penalty of revoking business registration certificates for enterprises formed through prohibited mergers or joint ventures. It also eliminates certain provisions that previously allowed for warning penalties or specific enforcement actions related to violations of other competition law provisions. These changes streamline the penalty framework and remove certain overlapping or redundant sanctions.

Digital Handling of Competition Sanctions

Article 33a adds an “electronic layer” to the competition enforcement framework. In substance it does not create any new types of infringements or new fine levels, but instead brings competition cases (including issuance and receipt of administrative sanctioning decisions) into compliance with the general regime on handling administrative violations in the electronic environment under Decree 118/2021 (as amended by Decrees 68/2025 and 190/2025).

For businesses, this paves the way for (i) interacting with the competition authority and receiving sanction decisions and procedural documents via electronic means with the same legal effect as paper service, which may shorten response and appeal timelines; and (ii) enhanced monitoring and enforcement of competition infringements committed online.

Companies should therefore ensure their internal processes cover how they receive, process and respond to competition authority communications electronically, not only in hard copy.

RELATED INSIGHTS​ 

October 3, 2025
On September 26, 2025, the Contract Committee under Thailand’s Consumer Protection Board issued a regulation that aims to standardize contracts and enhance consumer protection within the beauty and wellness industry. The Notification on Prescribing the Beauty Service Business as a Contract-Controlled Business B.E. 2568 (2025), which takes effect on January 24, 2026, requires business operators to use a prescribed standard contract in Thai and adhere to strict mandatory provisions and prohibitions. These regulations apply to operators across all in-person and online service channels, including via digital platforms. “Beauty services business” is defined as the provision of services under an agreement allowing consumers to receive a series of treatments, either over a set number of sessions or within a set period. This includes massage, spa, other methods for cleanliness, beauty, or care of facial or body skin, and weight control and body shaping—including services offered electronically. The law excludes surgery, liposuction, and medical treatments performed by licensed practitioners. The notification establishes the following key requirements: Mandatory contract and formatting. All contracts with consumers must use the standard contract form, in Thai, with clear, readable text (minimum font size of 2 millimeters, no more than 11 characters per inch), and include all essential terms from the annexed form. Contract execution. Contracts must be made in duplicate, with one copy given to the consumer at signing. For agreements concluded through electronic channels, the process must comply with the Electronic Transactions Act and use the same required terms. Digital platforms. Business operators who provide services facilitated through a digital platform as an intermediary are ultimately responsible for ensuring the consumer receives a compliant contract. Prohibited clauses. The law prohibits clauses that limit or exclude liability for damages to life, body, health, mind, or property resulting from breach of contract or a wrongful act;
October 1, 2025
In September 2025, Thailand’s Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) accused a company listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), including its current and former directors, of concealing material information in connection with its filing registration and draft prospectus. This recent enforcement action demonstrates the serious consequences of making false statements or appearing to conceal material information in IPO filings and ongoing disclosures. In addition to being subject to criminal penalties, such actions can impact the eligibility of directors and executives to serve and may cause lasting reputational damage. Key Legal Risks The Securities and Exchange Act B.E. 2535 (1992) (as amended) imposes strict liability for making false statements or concealing material information in IPO registration statements and draft prospectuses. In such cases, investors can claim for damages, and there are also criminal penalties, including imprisonment for up to five years and substantial fines, may apply to the company, its directors, and responsible officers. However, misstatements or omissions in IPO filings do not, by themselves, disqualify directors or executives from holding office, whether arising from an SEC accusation or even a final court judgment. In contrast, for ongoing disclosures after listing, such as financial statements, annual reports, and meeting notices, false or misleading statements or concealment of material information can result in not only criminal liability but also immediate disqualification of directors and executives. If the SEC accuses a listed company or its directors or executives of such misstatements or omissions, those directors or executives are immediately disqualified from their positions, even before a final court judgment. Director and Executive Qualifications Directors and executives must meet the SEC’s specified standards of trustworthiness, as set out in the relevant rules. The SEC clearly defines characteristics that are considered to demonstrate a lack of trustworthiness. For ongoing disclosures, being involved in
September 30, 2025
Vietnam’s higher education system is at a pivotal stage of reform, with the government taking decisive steps to strengthen its policy and regulatory framework. In response to obstacles encountered during the implementation of the Law on Higher Education, issued in 2012 and amended in 2018, the third draft of the amended Law on Higher Education (Draft Law) is scheduled for submission to the National Assembly in October 2025. The Draft Law reflects the state’s commitment to aligning the education sector with international standards while addressing persistent structural challenges. The Draft Law emphasizes clarifying institutional mandates, enhancing accountability, and modernizing governance models to enable higher education institutions to operate with greater autonomy and efficiency. Against this backdrop, we outline below several notable provisions of the third draft and their potential implications for higher education institutions (HEIs) in Vietnam. Applicable Entities In addition to HEIs as defined and covered under existing legislation, the Draft Law extends its scope of applicable entities. The current Law on Higher Education does not regulate training institutions under state agencies, the armed forces, or political and social organizations, nor does it provide specific provisions for institutions offering only postgraduate education. To address this, the Draft Law introduces the term “institutions with higher education activities,” expanding its scope to include: (a) academies and research institutes established by the prime minister, mandated to provide doctoral-level training; (b) educational institutions affiliated with state agencies, political organizations, socio-political organizations, and the people’s armed forces, authorized to offer higher education programs in their specialized fields; and (c) institutions established pursuant to international treaties or by decision of the prime minister, with authorization to deliver certain levels of higher education. The inclusion of “institutions with higher education activities” represents a significant development both legally and institutionally. In an increasingly diversified higher education
September 29, 2025
In September 2019, the government of Vietnam issued Decree No. 75/2019/ND-CP on Administrative Sanctions in the Field of Competition (Decree 75) to address the urgent need for clear sanctioning mechanisms following the implementation of the new Law on Competition in July 2019. However, after five years of enforcement, various gaps and inconsistencies have been exposed that hinder its application. These shortcomings have reduced the deterrent effect of the sanctioning regime, and created legal uncertainty for market participants. A recent case involving Duc Giang – Lao Cai Chemicals’ acquisition of another chemical company—one of the first cases of economic concentration violation to be sanctioned by the National Competition Commission (NCC) since the Law on Competition took effect—highlights the practical difficulties under Vietnam’s competition law enforcement regime. In this case, although the transaction exceeded the statutory notification thresholds of economic concentration set out in the law, the parties failed to submit the required notification. This violation resulted in the NCC imposing aggregate fines of VND 1,423,982,880 (approximately USD 54,770) on the companies in September 2024. On appeal, Duc Giang – Lao Cai Chemicals argued that the chairman of the NCC was legally entitled to issue a warning as the key punishment instead of a monetary penalty. However, the chairman rejected the appeal, citing Article 14 of Decree 75, under which the specific penalty and level for “failure to notify economic concentration” is a fine, not a warning. While the chairman of the NCC is generally empowered to impose penalties, a warning cannot be applied if the specific regulation for a particular violation does not provide for it as a sanction. This example shows the inadequacy and inconsistency of the regulations on penalties for violations of competition law, and underscores the need for an amendment of Decree 75 to resolve such conflicts