Thailand’s cabinet has approved the draft Act on Liability for Defective Goods, commonly called Thailand’s “Lemon Law.” The Draft Act is currently pending consideration by Parliament. The draft law aims to strengthen buyers’ position in pursuing cases against sellers. While the Civil and Commercial Code offers provisions governing liability for defective goods, it is difficult in practice for buyers to successfully make a claim against sellers, particularly where defects are latent and not discoverable at the time of sale or delivery. By introducing product-specific rules and clearer remedies, the new law is intended to modernize Thailand’s consumer protection framework and align it more closely with international standards, and to help relieve the buyer’s burden of proof against the seller in product liability cases. If enacted, the draft act will take effect 180 days after publication in the Government Gazette, giving businesses a transition period to assess their compliance obligations. This article provides an overview of the key provisions of the draft act and highlights some practical considerations for businesses operating in Thailand. Scope and Key Definitions The draft act applies to sellers—defined as persons who sell goods in the ordinary course of business—and protects buyers, a term defined broadly to include not just the original purchaser but also transferees and successors in title. This expands the class of people who can bring claims. The law does not apply to used goods, live animals, or goods exempted by future ministerial regulation. It also leaves intact any separate warranties, promises, advertisements, or other guarantees a seller has given; those remain enforceable alongside the new statutory rights. General Liability for Defective Goods Sellers are liable for defects that exist at the time of delivery, regardless of whether the seller knew about them. Liability arises where a defect reduces: The benefit intended under

Thailand’s Board of Investment (BOI) has significantly revised its post-approval compliance framework for projects that receive investment promotion incentives, replacing the previous semiannual reporting system for project progress with a new quarterly reporting regime. The initial report is due by July 30, 2026, covering the second-quarter reporting period of April to June 2026. The new requirements—implemented through BOI Announcement No. 8/2569 and Office of the BOI Notification No. Por. 8/2569, both of which became effective on March 30, 2026—apply both to newly promoted projects and to existing promoted projects that remain in the implementation stage. Background Under the previous reporting framework, BOI-promoted companies that had not yet commenced full operations were generally required to submit reports on project progress to the BOI twice a year (February and July) through the BOI’s e-Monitoring system. By adopting a quarterly reporting regime, the BOI seeks to strengthen monitoring and evaluation of investment progress and project implementation. Reporting Requirements Under the new regulations, BOI-promoted companies must submit project progress reports on a quarterly basis during the implementation phase of a promoted project. The reporting periods and submission deadlines are: Q1 (January–March): April 30 Q2 (April–June): July 30 Q3 (July–September): October 30 Q4 (October–December): January 30 of the following year The quarterly reporting obligation runs from the date the BOI promotion certificate is issued until the BOI grants approval for commencement of full operations. For newly promoted projects, no quarterly report is required for the quarter in which the BOI promotion certificate is issued—the first reporting obligation arises in the immediately following reporting period. All project progress reports must be submitted electronically through the BOI’s e-Monitoring system. The existing annual reporting requirement also remains in effect, requiring promoted companies to submit an annual operating results report through the e-Monitoring system by July 31 of

Arbitrator independence and impartiality form the cornerstone of a legitimate arbitral process. Under section 19 of the Thai Arbitration Act B.E. 2545 (2002), prospective arbitrators must disclose circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to their impartiality or independence, and existing arbitrators must do so throughout proceedings. This mirrors article 12 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. Yet despite this clear mandate, practical implementation varies significantly across Thailand’s arbitration landscape. Background Thailand’s two principal arbitration institutions, the Thai Arbitration Institute (TAI) and the Thailand Arbitration Center (THAC), both maintain procedures for addressing arbitrator challenges and require compliance with the statutory disclosure obligation. Under both sets of rules, any party wishing to challenge an arbitrator must submit a challenge application within fifteen days of becoming aware of the relevant facts, and a committee is appointed to consider the matter on a case-by-case basis. The TAI additionally prescribes its Code of Ethics and Conduct for Arbitrators to further emphasize the expectation of impartiality and transparency. However, Thailand’s arbitration ecosystem extends well beyond the TAI and THAC. Several sector-specific institutions also administer arbitral proceedings, including the Thai Commercial Arbitration Office under the Board of Trade of Thailand, the Arbitration Centre of the Office of the Insurance Commission, the Arbitration Centre of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Office for the Prevention and Resolution of Disputes regarding Intellectual Property, and the Arbitration Centre of the Thai General Insurance Association. These institutions each operate under their own procedural rules, which were developed to serve particular industries and dispute profiles. The procedural mechanisms for securing and documenting an independence declaration are not uniformly established across these forums. Consequences of Procedural Inconsistency This creates a notable gap. Not all arbitration bodies have a formalized procedure requiring written independence statements before proceedings commence. Some tribunals proceed

The president of Thailand’s Supreme Court has issued new recommendations providing courts with criminal jurisdiction with a comprehensive framework for identifying and dismissing criminal cases brought in bad faith. Published in the Government Gazette on May 29, 2026, after being signed on May 25, the Recommendations of the President of the Supreme Court Concerning Bad-Faith Litigation in Criminal Cases B.E. 2569 were issued under Section 5 of the Act on the Organization of Courts of Justice. The recommendations took effect upon publication and represent a significant step in Thailand’s efforts to curb abusive criminal litigation, including strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPP). Background Section 161/1 of Thailand’s Criminal Procedure Code empowers courts to dismiss criminal cases filed dishonestly or with the intent to harass or take unfair advantage of a defendant. The new recommendations provide detailed guidance that courts previously lacked on identifying and handling such prosecutions. Definition of Bad-Faith Litigation Under recommendation 1, filing a criminal case in bad faith is defined broadly to encompass three categories: Harassment-type filings involving intimidation, threats, or creating unreasonable hardship for the defendant; Coercive filings designed to pressure the defendant into acting or refraining from acting for illegitimate benefit; and False or misleading filings that deliberately assert incorrect material facts or conceal such facts. Circumstances Indicating Bad Faith Recommendation 2 sets out specific circumstances that should raise a court’s suspicion that a filing may violate section 161/1. These include: Filing in a distant court far from the defendant’s domicile without benefiting the adjudication; Retaliation against the defendant’s advocacy for human rights, environmental protection, consumer rights, labor rights, or other public interests—effectively establishing an express anti-SLAPP framework; Retaliation against whistleblowers who disclosed corruption or unlawful conduct; Retaliation against individuals responsible for investigating the plaintiff’s wrongdoing or who concluded such an investigation; Filing multiple