You are using an outdated browser and your browsing experience will not be optimal. Please update to the latest version of Microsoft Edge, Google Chrome or Mozilla Firefox. Install Microsoft Edge

October 16, 2015

The Single-Shareholder Companies Law and Its Expected Impact on SMEs

Bangkok Post, Corporate Counsellor Column

In 2008, amendments to the Civil and Commercial Code (CCC) reduced the minimum number of shareholders required to incorporate a limited company to three from seven. This change seemed to encourage new business registration, as the number of newly incorporated juristic persons in Thailand has increased at an average rate of 8 percent per year since then, except for 2009 and 2014.

The Business Development Department counts 400,000 limited companies in Thailand, with 60,000 new ones expected to be registered this year. More than half these companies have less than THB 1 million in registered capital and a third between THB 1 and 10 million. In the first quarter alone, 17,309 small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) were registered and operating as limited companies.

All of these limited companies have at least three shareholders, but in practice there is often only one shareholder who truly owns and manages the company. When incorporating a limited company, this shareholder can incur unnecessary costs as he or she attempts to find at least two others to form the company.

For this reason, the department is now studying the viability of incorporating companies with a single shareholder. It has sought advice from Chulalongkorn University’s law faculty, which has assembled a research team.

This team has considered the laws of other countries including Japan, Singapore, Britain, the US and Vietnam. As well, the model law of the UN Commission on International Trade Law in the past required more than one shareholder to incorporate a limited company, as companies were established by contractual relationship.

However, in line with the evolution of business customs, court rulings or amendments to statutory law, single-shareholder companies are now permitted in many jurisdictions provided that the principal concepts of a limited company remain unchanged. These concepts include: (i) a separate legal entity; (ii) limited liability; (iii) control by shareholders; and (iv) transferability of shares.

The research team released a tentative draft law named the Incorporation of a Company by a Single Shareholder Act for a public hearing in August. It invited both government agencies and private-sector entities to provide input.

It was revealed the new single-shareholder company scheme would be a separate enactment from the CCC, under which any laws and regulations that applied to a limited company would also apply to a single-shareholder company as long as they did not contradict the nature of a single-shareholder company.

The key points of the draft are as follows:

  • Any one person or juristic person can be a promoter and file an application to incorporate a limited company.
  • There is no minimum par value.
  • The single shareholder can hold a statutory meeting and pass resolutions, and hold an ordinary meeting or extraordinary general meeting and pass resolutions, without the need to call for a shareholders’ meeting.
  • The shareholder is not liable, directly or indirectly, for company debt with other persons solely on the basis of being the shareholder of the company (which is made clearer than as stated in the CCC).
  • For any transaction between the company and the shareholder that is not the normal business of the company, the director shall cause such transaction to be made in writing andrecord all agreements in the minutes of the directors’ meeting (a new good governance measure).
  • If the company’s sales volume or income does not reach the criteria set in the ministerial regulations, the company may not need to audit its books. There is currently no cut-off figure for the amount the company can waive for auditing.
  • The company can amalgamate with other single-shareholder companies and transfer all shares to one shareholder.
  • A limited company formed under the CCC can be converted into a single-shareholder company and vice versa.

The single-shareholder company programme may encourage the registration of SMEs as limited companies, as they would have greater access to financial resources and lower compliance costs compared with limited companies incorporated under the CCC.

As well, other stakeholders such as suppliers and creditors will also benefit from the legal status as a registered limited company, which, for example, provides more convenience to review the status of a single-shareholder company through the Business Development Department.

The draft is currently being reviewed by the department’s legal division. In all likelihood, it will be proposed to the National Legislative Assembly, at which time it should become clearer whether the new law will, in practice, benefit and promote SMEs.

RELATED INSIGHTS​ 

October 31, 2025
On September 29, 2025, Thailand’s Office of the Personal Data Protection Committee (PDPC Office) published its Regulations on the Review and Certification of Binding Corporate Rules B.E. 2568 (2025) (the Regulations). The Regulations provide clarity on the PDPC Office’s approach to reviewing and certifying binding corporate rules (BCRs) under Section 29 of the Personal Data Protection Act B.E. 2562 (2019) (PDPA), and aim to facilitate international data transfers within a group of undertakings or enterprises (a “corporate group”). In conjunction with this development, the PDPC Office also approved BCRs for two companies operating in Thailand on September 30, 2025. This milestone represents the first concrete progress since the PDPC’s Notification on Criteria for the Protection of Personal Data Sent or Transferred to a Foreign Country pursuant to Section 29 of the PDPA B.E. 2566 (2023) came into effect in March 2024. Some key features of the Regulations are set out below. Categorization of BCRs BCRs are classified into two types: (1) BCRs for Controllers (BCR-C) and (2) BCRs for Processors (BCR-P). The category must be clearly specified when submitting the BCRs to the PDPC Office. Documentation Requirement The applicant must prepare and submit the application (a standard template may be provided by the PDPC Office in the future) along with supporting documents for review and certification in the Thai language. If the supporting documents are in a foreign language, a certified Thai translation should be provided. The translation must be notarized by a notary public or qualified person. Supporting documents may include, among others, a binding instrument such as an intra-group agreement, or a list of entities subject to the BCRs. Expedited Process Requirement Organizations with existing BCR approvals under the EU or UK GDPR, or from countries announced by the PDPC under Section 28, may apply through an
October 30, 2025
Recent events at a Thai listed company, where a proposal to remove the director was not successful, amid claims that a competitor was attempting to gain control of the company, illustrate how disputes over corporate control can unfold differently at the board level and shareholder level. At the board level, removing directors of a listed company mid-term to gain corporate control is not an easy task under Thai law, as it requires a higher threshold than appointing a new director, which typically only requires a simple majority vote in a listed company. At the shareholder level, Thailand’s tender offer and competition regimes add complexity where different shareholder groups act in concert to remove opposing board representatives or otherwise influence control. In this article, we will explore why the attempted removal of a director may fail, and how the tender offer regime may apply. Key Issues at a Glance Shareholder groups may seek to convene meetings to propose changes to board composition or company authority. Such proposals can be delayed or complicated by regulatory requirements and the need for additional disclosures. Regulatory authorities and minority shareholders may raise concerns when major shareholders coordinate to influence board control, especially if such actions could trigger tender offer or merger control obligations. Companies often respond by seeking further information on shareholder relationships and potential conflicts before proceeding. Why the Director Removal Failed Under Section 76 of the Public Limited Companies Act B.E. 2535 (as amended), the early removal of a director requires two conditions to be satisfied at the same meeting of shareholders: Headcount test: At least 75% of shareholders attending and entitled to vote must vote in favor. If multiple shareholders appoint the same person as proxy, each proxy is counted as a separate head for the purpose of the headcount test,
October 24, 2025
On October 22, 2025, the Thai government posted a directive not to grant gambling licenses for gambling involving poker nationwide to crack down on illegal gambling activities. The directive was issued by Thailand’s Ministry of Interior to align with government policies to prevent the legalization of all types of gambling businesses, including poker as a sporting activity. This will result in the revocation of poker activities as sport and institute a strict ban on such activities nationwide. Businesses should note the new government’s strict approach toward gambling activities as the legal situation regarding gambling in the country continues to draw close attention.
October 1, 2025
In September 2025, Thailand’s Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) accused a company listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), including its current and former directors, of concealing material information in connection with its filing registration and draft prospectus. This recent enforcement action demonstrates the serious consequences of making false statements or appearing to conceal material information in IPO filings and ongoing disclosures. In addition to being subject to criminal penalties, such actions can impact the eligibility of directors and executives to serve and may cause lasting reputational damage. Key Legal Risks The Securities and Exchange Act B.E. 2535 (1992) (as amended) imposes strict liability for making false statements or concealing material information in IPO registration statements and draft prospectuses. In such cases, investors can claim for damages, and there are also criminal penalties, including imprisonment for up to five years and substantial fines, may apply to the company, its directors, and responsible officers. However, misstatements or omissions in IPO filings do not, by themselves, disqualify directors or executives from holding office, whether arising from an SEC accusation or even a final court judgment. In contrast, for ongoing disclosures after listing, such as financial statements, annual reports, and meeting notices, false or misleading statements or concealment of material information can result in not only criminal liability but also immediate disqualification of directors and executives. If the SEC accuses a listed company or its directors or executives of such misstatements or omissions, those directors or executives are immediately disqualified from their positions, even before a final court judgment. Director and Executive Qualifications Directors and executives must meet the SEC’s specified standards of trustworthiness, as set out in the relevant rules. The SEC clearly defines characteristics that are considered to demonstrate a lack of trustworthiness. For ongoing disclosures, being involved in