The Bank of Thailand (BOT) has officially implemented a new regulatory framework supervising systemically important retail payment systems (SIRPS), effective February 21, 2026, with PromptPay being the first payment system designated as a SIRPS. Under this new set of regulations, the BOT may designate payment systems under the Payment Systems Act B.E. 2560 (2017) as SIRPSs based on quantitative and qualitative assessments. Once a system is designated as a SIRPS, the operator becomes subject to expanded supervisory obligations beyond the general requirements of the Payment Systems Act. Enhanced Supervisory Requirements SIRPS operators must comply with a heightened supervisory regime across three key areas, outlined below. 1. Governance SIRPS operators must maintain robust and transparent governance structures, including: Balanced board composition, with at least one-third of the board comprising independent directors who represent stakeholders in the system (such as payment service providers, consumers, and experts). Independent directors may serve for no more than two consecutive terms. Subcommittees to assist the board in overseeing compliance, policy implementation, and operational strategy. Clear separation between executives responsible for risk and information security and those overseeing day-to-day business operations. Risk Management and System SecuritySIRPS operators must implement comprehensive risk management frameworks, including: Clear service agreements between the SIRPS operator and its direct participants (payment service providers who connect directly to the SIRPS), defining roles and responsibilities among stakeholders. These agreements must include obligations for direct SIRPS participants to supervise any indirect participants they onboard to ensure compliance with service agreements and business rules. A business continuity plan covering both IT and non-IT aspects, with annual review. The SIRPS must target service availability comparable to international payment infrastructures, including the ability to recover operations within two hours of a disruption and to maintain scalable operational capacity. Tools and controls to monitor and manage material or

In December 2025, the National Assembly of Vietnam enacted a new Law on Construction, replacing the 2014 Law on Construction as amended in 2020. The 2025 Law on Construction will, in principle, take effect on July 1, 2026, subject to certain exceptions. Among its notable reforms, one development has attracted particular attention from both legal practitioners and market participants: the introduction of a statutory framework governing predetermined damages, commonly referred to as “liquidated damages.” This marks the first time liquidated damages have been expressly recognized at the level of primary legislation in Vietnam. While liquidated damages clauses have long been a common feature of construction contracts in practice, their legal enforceability has historically been subject to uncertainty. Although the new provision appears to represent a positive step toward greater legal clarity, it remains an open question whether it is sufficient, on its own, to provide a solid legal basis for the enforceability of liquidated damages clauses in construction disputes in Vietnam. What’s New? Article 86.2 of the 2025 Law on Construction provides (emphasis added): “Compensation for damages shall be determined on the basis of actual damages [or] predetermined damages corresponding to obligations under the construction contracts that are breached [and] the extent of such breaches.” This provision is significant in that it expressly recognizes predetermined damages, or liquidated damages, as a lawful basis for determining compensation for damage. However, the new law does not define “predetermined damages.” The absence of a statutory definition creates potential ambiguity as to the scope and nature of this concept and may give rise to disputes over how—and whether—a particular contractual clause qualifies as predetermined damages for the purposes of Article 86.2. Further, Article 86.2 qualifies the application of predetermined damages by requiring that such damages correspond to the obligations not fulfilled and the

When unauthorized credit card transactions occur, who bears responsibility—the cardholder or the issuing bank? In Thailand, a landmark 2025 ruling by the country’s Supreme Court has clarified this question, establishing a stricter standard for banks in fraud disputes and significantly strengthening consumer protections. The case centered on disputed charges where a customer claimed their credit card had been used without authorization. The bank sued to recover the amount, and both the court of first instance and the Court of Appeal ruled in favor of the bank. However, the Supreme Court overruled their judgments and decided that the customer did not need to pay for the unauthorized transactions, placing liability squarely on the bank. This ruling was based on three key findings, which are outlined below. Finding 1: Insufficient Expert Testimony In this case, the bank bore the burden of proving matters related to the credit card system’s manufacture, design, security, and operation, as required under the Consumer Case Procedure Act B.E. 2551 (2008). To meet this requirement, the bank presented testimony from two employees in its credit card department regarding ’security measures and issuance procedures. However, the Supreme Court found these witnesses unqualified as experts, as they did not present technical or academic evidence and did not possess specialized expertise in credit card technology. As a result, their testimony failed to establish that the bank’s credit card technology was sufficiently secure against fraudulent misuse. Finding 2: Contradictory Terms and Conditions The bank’s own credit card terms and conditions included a provision acknowledging that despite the card’s EMV security standards, cardholders must still exercise caution to prevent unauthorized access. The Supreme Court interpreted this clause as an explicit admission that credit card systems remain vulnerable to hacking and fraud, even with high-level security measures in place. This acknowledgment undermined the

On November 18, 2025, Vietnam’s Ministry of Finance released for public consultation a draft decree on administrative sanctions in the field of crypto assets and crypto asset markets (the “Draft Decree”), intended to implement Resolution No. 05/2025/NQ-CP dated September 9, 2025, on the pilot crypto asset market in Vietnam (“Resolution 05”). While Resolution 05 sets out who may participate and under what conditions, the Draft Decree addresses a more practical question for market participants, i.e., what happens if those conditions are not met. In doing so, the Draft Decree offers important insight into how Vietnamese regulators intend to supervise, discipline, and ultimately shape the crypto market during the pilot phase. Regulatory Scope and Overall Sanctions Architecture The Draft Decree applies to both domestic and foreign organizations and individuals engaging in crypto-related activities in Vietnam’s market. Covered entities include: (i) crypto asset issuers; (ii) crypto asset service providers, including trading platforms and market operators; (iii) Vietnamese and foreign investors participating in the pilot market; and (iv) other organizations involved in the offering, issuance, or provision of crypto-related services in Vietnam. The breadth of this scope is deliberate. It appears to reflect a regulatory view that cross-border structures, offshore platforms, and indirect participation may not necessarily insulate market actors from compliance obligations once they operate within the pilot framework. For the crypto industry, this may mark a shift from regulatory ambiguity toward a more explicit articulation of jurisdictional reach. At first glance, the Draft Decree’s monetary penalties appear restrained. The maximum fine per administrative violation is capped at VND 200 million (approx. USD 7,700) for organizations and VND 100 million (approx. USD 3,800) for individuals. However, focusing solely on fine levels risks missing the point. The Draft Decree also places great regulatory weight on supplementary sanctions and corrective measures, including: (i)