Thailand’s Supreme Administrative Court has issued a decisive ruling annulling the Ministry of Labor’s notification that had granted an exemption for foreign pilots to fly domestic routes under wet‑lease arrangements. A wet lease is a leasing arrangement in which the aircraft is provided together with its foreign flight crew, including pilots, and related operational support, rather than the airline supplying its own pilots. The judgment, delivered on November 17, 2025, and published in the Government Gazette on January 30, 2026, follows a legal challenge brought by the Thai Pilots Association, which argued that the exemption unlawfully enabled foreign workers to assume a role traditionally reserved for Thai nationals. The notification in question, dated December 13, 2024, authorized foreign pilots who came as part of wet‑leased aircraft to fly domestic routes. The Thai Pilots Association disputed the legality of this rationale, asserting that the exemption was triggered by a private airline’s request rather than by any statutory necessity. The Ministry of Labor justified this measure by relying on aircraft‑specific approvals issued by the Ministry of Transport and by enabling the Department of Employment to issue corresponding work permits. Arguments Presented in the Case The Thai Pilots Association argued that the exemption undermined the interests of domestic pilots and conflicted with the policy intent of Thailand’s foreign‑worker regulatory framework. The lawsuit emphasized that the notification arose directly from a private airline company’s request to operate two A320 aircraft under a wet lease and that the measure had the practical effect of displacing Thai pilots who remained unemployed. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Labor defended the exemption as a temporary and necessary response to industry shortages and part of national efforts to support tourism and restore aviation capacity. Legal Framework Thai law establishes a general prohibition against foreign nationals piloting domestic aircraft. Section

When unauthorized credit card transactions occur, who bears responsibility—the cardholder or the issuing bank? In Thailand, a landmark 2025 ruling by the country’s Supreme Court has clarified this question, establishing a stricter standard for banks in fraud disputes and significantly strengthening consumer protections. The case centered on disputed charges where a customer claimed their credit card had been used without authorization. The bank sued to recover the amount, and both the court of first instance and the Court of Appeal ruled in favor of the bank. However, the Supreme Court overruled their judgments and decided that the customer did not need to pay for the unauthorized transactions, placing liability squarely on the bank. This ruling was based on three key findings, which are outlined below. Finding 1: Insufficient Expert Testimony In this case, the bank bore the burden of proving matters related to the credit card system’s manufacture, design, security, and operation, as required under the Consumer Case Procedure Act B.E. 2551 (2008). To meet this requirement, the bank presented testimony from two employees in its credit card department regarding ’security measures and issuance procedures. However, the Supreme Court found these witnesses unqualified as experts, as they did not present technical or academic evidence and did not possess specialized expertise in credit card technology. As a result, their testimony failed to establish that the bank’s credit card technology was sufficiently secure against fraudulent misuse. Finding 2: Contradictory Terms and Conditions The bank’s own credit card terms and conditions included a provision acknowledging that despite the card’s EMV security standards, cardholders must still exercise caution to prevent unauthorized access. The Supreme Court interpreted this clause as an explicit admission that credit card systems remain vulnerable to hacking and fraud, even with high-level security measures in place. This acknowledgment undermined the

Thailand’s alternative dispute resolution (ADR) landscape has evolved significantly over the past decade. Legislative reforms such as the Dispute Mediation Act and expanded court‑annexed mediation have strengthened non‑litigious options, while institutional choices have broadened. Parties can now choose between the Thai Arbitration Institute (TAI), the Thailand Arbitration Center (THAC), and a growing number of sector‑specific dispute forums. For businesses, these choices matter. Each forum has different rules, administration, costs, speed, and enforcement mechanisms. These factors can directly impact commercial leverage, recovery outcomes, and business continuity. Choosing the right forum and drafting an effective dispute resolution clause can materially influence how a dispute is resolved. This article outlines the practical differences between Thailand’s leading alternative dispute resolution forums, explains when each is likely to deliver the most value, and offers drafting and strategy tips to embed those advantages into your dispute resolution clauses. Why ADR Is Gaining Traction in Thailand Thai policy increasingly supports the resolution of civil and commercial disputes through ADR. Recent amendments to the Civil Procedure Code now provide for court-supervised pre-action and in-case mediation. This type of mediation has its advantages: it suspends limitation periods, involves no court fees, and can conclude with a consent judgment that is immediately enforceable and subject to only limited grounds of appeal. In parallel, the Mediation Act supports out‑of‑court mediation for qualifying disputes within defined subject‑matter and monetary thresholds. Valid settlement agreements reached under this law may be enforced through a streamlined court process. Thailand’s arbitration framework has also matured into a reliable, pro‑enforcement framework under the Arbitration Act, which closely follows the UNCITRAL Model Law and applies to both domestic and international cases, so cross‑border users see familiar rules. As Thailand is a signatory to the New York Convention, Thai courts generally recognize and enforce foreign awards subject only

On December 26, 2025, the government of Vietnam promulgated Decree No. 341/2025/ND-CP on administrative sanctions for violations of copyright and related rights (Decree 341), with an effective date of February 15, 2026. The new decree replaces Decree No. 131/2013/ND-CP, as amended, and represents the first comprehensive revision of the administrative enforcement framework in this area in eight years. Legislative Context and Objectives Decree 341 reflects Vietnam’s evolving copyright and related-rights framework, particularly in light of the country’s commitments under bilateral, regional, and multilateral treaties governing the digital environment. While the decree retains a number of provisions from the previous regime, it also introduces significant amendments to infringing acts, penalty thresholds, remedial measures, and enforcement procedures. The primary objectives of the new decree are to (i) enhance the deterrent effect of administrative sanctions; (ii) harmonize sanctions with the 2025 amendments to the Law on Intellectual Property and criminal law principles; and (iii) address enforcement challenges arising from online and cross-border exploitation of copyrighted works. Expanded Scope of Sanctionable Subjects Under Decree 341, administrative sanctions apply not only to Vietnamese entities committing infringing acts within Vietnam, but also to Vietnamese and foreign entities that commit acts of infringement on the internet where the protected content is accessed, consumed, or exploited by users in Vietnam. This expansion reflects the realities of cross-border digital exploitation. However, the decree does not yet provide precise definitions of key terms such as “users” or “consumers” of digital content in Vietnam, which may require further regulatory clarification. Monetary Penalties and Penalty Structure The statutory maximum fines remain unchanged, at VND 250 million for individuals and VND 500 million for organizations, but the penalty framework is substantially restructured. Fines are now calibrated based on three core criteria: (i) the amount of illegal profit obtained; (ii) the level of