Thailand and the United States signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) titled “Cooperation to Diversify Global Critical Minerals Supply Chains and Promote Investments” on October 26, 2025, signaling a new strategic alignment aimed at developing Thailand’s mineral sector, particularly in rare earth elements (REEs). The MOU has implications for investments in technology, manufacturing, and other related sectors. This update outlines the key provisions of the MOU and the potential opportunities and legal navigating points for businesses. Objectives The primary driver of this agreement is the US initiative to diversify global supply chains for critical minerals and reduce reliance on current market leaders, particularly China. For Thailand, it represents a major opportunity to attract high-tech investment and develop its downstream processing industries. The cooperation is set to focus on five main areas: Technical knowledge: Exchange of technical expertise and international best practices to strengthen Thailand’s mining and processing sector. Joint cooperation: Establishing workshops, seminars, and scientific collaboration to boost innovation. Regulatory practice: Promoting good governance and streamlining regulatory and licensing procedures. Information sharing: Sharing data on potential projects and global market prices. Full-value chain: The MOU covers the entire mineral lifecycle, from exploration and extraction to processing, refining, and recycling. “First Opportunity to Invest” Clause The most debated provision within the MOU states that “participants expect to have the first opportunity to invest . . . in critical minerals assets that may be sold in Thailand.” Business implications: This clause is widely interpreted as granting US companies a first look or preferential access to investment opportunities in Thailand’s critical minerals sector. This could be a significant advantage for US-based or affiliated companies in mining, technology, and energy seeking to secure a foothold in a developing REE supply chain. Thai government position: Thai officials, including the prime minister, have publicly clarified

On September 29, 2025, Thailand’s Office of the Personal Data Protection Committee (PDPC Office) published its Regulations on the Review and Certification of Binding Corporate Rules B.E. 2568 (2025) (the Regulations). The Regulations provide clarity on the PDPC Office’s approach to reviewing and certifying binding corporate rules (BCRs) under Section 29 of the Personal Data Protection Act B.E. 2562 (2019) (PDPA), and aim to facilitate international data transfers within a group of undertakings or enterprises (a “corporate group”). In conjunction with this development, the PDPC Office also approved BCRs for two companies operating in Thailand on September 30, 2025. This milestone represents the first concrete progress since the PDPC’s Notification on Criteria for the Protection of Personal Data Sent or Transferred to a Foreign Country pursuant to Section 29 of the PDPA B.E. 2566 (2023) came into effect in March 2024. Some key features of the Regulations are set out below. Categorization of BCRs BCRs are classified into two types: (1) BCRs for Controllers (BCR-C) and (2) BCRs for Processors (BCR-P). The category must be clearly specified when submitting the BCRs to the PDPC Office. Documentation Requirement The applicant must prepare and submit the application (a standard template may be provided by the PDPC Office in the future) along with supporting documents for review and certification in the Thai language. If the supporting documents are in a foreign language, a certified Thai translation should be provided. The translation must be notarized by a notary public or qualified person. Supporting documents may include, among others, a binding instrument such as an intra-group agreement, or a list of entities subject to the BCRs. Expedited Process Requirement Organizations with existing BCR approvals under the EU or UK GDPR, or from countries announced by the PDPC under Section 28, may apply through an

Recent events at a Thai listed company, where a proposal to remove the director was not successful, amid claims that a competitor was attempting to gain control of the company, illustrate how disputes over corporate control can unfold differently at the board level and shareholder level. At the board level, removing directors of a listed company mid-term to gain corporate control is not an easy task under Thai law, as it requires a higher threshold than appointing a new director, which typically only requires a simple majority vote in a listed company. At the shareholder level, Thailand’s tender offer and competition regimes add complexity where different shareholder groups act in concert to remove opposing board representatives or otherwise influence control. In this article, we will explore why the attempted removal of a director may fail, and how the tender offer regime may apply. Key Issues at a Glance Shareholder groups may seek to convene meetings to propose changes to board composition or company authority. Such proposals can be delayed or complicated by regulatory requirements and the need for additional disclosures. Regulatory authorities and minority shareholders may raise concerns when major shareholders coordinate to influence board control, especially if such actions could trigger tender offer or merger control obligations. Companies often respond by seeking further information on shareholder relationships and potential conflicts before proceeding. Why the Director Removal Failed Under Section 76 of the Public Limited Companies Act B.E. 2535 (as amended), the early removal of a director requires two conditions to be satisfied at the same meeting of shareholders: Headcount test: At least 75% of shareholders attending and entitled to vote must vote in favor. If multiple shareholders appoint the same person as proxy, each proxy is counted as a separate head for the purpose of the headcount test,

Thailand currently lacks a specific franchise act. Consequently, the legality of any franchise agreement is determined by its compliance with various existing laws, such as the Civil and Commercial Code, the Trademark Act B.E. 2534 (1991) (as amended), and the Unfair Contract Terms Act B.E. 2530 (1997). Thailand is a freedom-to-contract jurisdiction. This allows for a high degree of flexibility and autonomy in contractual arrangements, provided that the terms do not violate any laws or public policy and do not fall under the scope of unfair contract terms. Given this, the requirement for fairness in franchise agreement terms often leads to uncertainty, but decisions from the Trade Competition Commission of Thailand (TCCT) can provide guidance on whether specific contentious terms are in fact fair.  One issue worth examining in this light is the inclusion of terms on nonrefundable franchise fees and strict purchasing conditions. Franchise Fee: Unfair to Refuse Refund? Nonrefundable franchise fees represent a significant upfront investment for franchisees, often becoming a point of contention if the franchise relationship deteriorates or the franchisor ceases operations. Their fairness and enforceability are frequently scrutinized by regulatory bodies like the TCCT, highlighting the critical balance between contractual freedom and franchisee protection. Faced with one such case, the TCCT considered whether it was unfair for the franchisor to refuse to refund the franchise fee after the franchisor ceased operations.  The franchisee had entered into a service agreement on August 2, 2021, and begun operating on October 9, 2021. However, by November 21, 2023, the franchisee was notified that the system would be shut down for maintenance, and by December 26, 2023, the franchisor announced the cessation of operations due to financial losses. The franchisee then requested a refund of the franchise fee. Unfortunately for the franchisee, the TCCT found that the franchisor’s