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September 30, 2025

Inside Vietnam’s Latest Draft Law on Higher Education

Vietnam’s higher education system is at a pivotal stage of reform, with the government taking decisive steps to strengthen its policy and regulatory framework. In response to obstacles encountered during the implementation of the Law on Higher Education, issued in 2012 and amended in 2018, the third draft of the amended Law on Higher Education (Draft Law) is scheduled for submission to the National Assembly in October 2025. The Draft Law reflects the state’s commitment to aligning the education sector with international standards while addressing persistent structural challenges.

The Draft Law emphasizes clarifying institutional mandates, enhancing accountability, and modernizing governance models to enable higher education institutions to operate with greater autonomy and efficiency. Against this backdrop, we outline below several notable provisions of the third draft and their potential implications for higher education institutions (HEIs) in Vietnam.

Applicable Entities

In addition to HEIs as defined and covered under existing legislation, the Draft Law extends its scope of applicable entities. The current Law on Higher Education does not regulate training institutions under state agencies, the armed forces, or political and social organizations, nor does it provide specific provisions for institutions offering only postgraduate education. To address this, the Draft Law introduces the term “institutions with higher education activities,” expanding its scope to include: (a) academies and research institutes established by the prime minister, mandated to provide doctoral-level training; (b) educational institutions affiliated with state agencies, political organizations, socio-political organizations, and the people’s armed forces, authorized to offer higher education programs in their specialized fields; and (c) institutions established pursuant to international treaties or by decision of the prime minister, with authorization to deliver certain levels of higher education.

The inclusion of “institutions with higher education activities” represents a significant development both legally and institutionally. In an increasingly diversified higher education landscape, the training of highly qualified human resources is no longer confined to HEIs but also involves research institutes, academies, and other specialized educational entities. By broadening the scope of regulation, the Draft Law provides a clearer legal foundation for institutions with higher education activities to conduct these activities, while simultaneously enhancing the state’s capacity to oversee, monitor, and safeguard the quality of teaching and research.

Institutional Autonomy of HEIs

Under the Draft Law, “autonomy” is defined as the right to make independent decisions and bear responsibility for accountability within the framework of the law. HEIs are granted comprehensive autonomy in matters of organizational structure and personnel, training activities, and international cooperation; autonomy in scientific research, technology, and innovation; and the highest degree of autonomy in financial management, asset utilization, and investment. This autonomy is only subject to limitation in cases where institutions fail to meet quality assurance standards or violate prevailing regulations on higher education activities. Importantly, the Draft Law no longer imposes conditions or requires a formal recognition mechanism for autonomy; rather, autonomy is the default entitlement of the HEIs under the law.

It should be noted, however, that the Draft Law addresses institutional autonomy only in relation to HEIs and does not extend this principle to other institutions with higher education activities. This distinction is logical, as the latter are primarily entities funded and maintained by the state through public budgets and facilities. Accordingly, their operations fall not only under the scope of the Law on Higher Education but also under broader regulations governing public assets, state budget management, and other related legal instruments. As such, institutions with higher education activities cannot exercise the same level of autonomy as HEIs and must remain subject to the financial, asset, and investment management authority of their respective state governing bodies.

University Councils

The Draft Law simplifies and harmonizes the regulations governing university councils across all types of HEIs, making no distinction between public and private entities.

Under the Draft Law, the university council is entrusted with key governance functions, including defining the institution’s strategic direction, determining its organizational structure, allocating and managing resources, and overseeing the implementation of strategic plans and accountability mechanisms.

Importantly, the council does not assume responsibility for day-to-day management or operations, which remain within the remit of the rector or principal. By establishing the council as an independent governance body, distinct from executive management, the Draft Law aims to strengthen transparency in decision-making and enhance the effectiveness of oversight within higher education governance.

The reference to the university council as representing “relevant stakeholders,” as well as the inclusion of “relevant stakeholders” in the composition of the council, may lead to significant legal, organizational, and practical challenges if not clearly defined. In addition, without specific criteria, the selection of stakeholder representatives may become subjective and susceptible to group interests or a lack of transparency. Therefore, the Draft Law would benefit from revision to clarify this concept.

It is worth noting that other specific issues of the university council such as eligibility requirements and procedures for personnel decisions will be addressed through government regulations, rather than being detailed directly in the law, as was the case in the previous framework.

Development and Implementation of Training Programs

Under the current regulations, except for certain specialized fields (such as those in health sciences), HEIs that meet the conditions for institutional autonomy can have their rectors decide on the opening of new training majors. For institutions that do not yet qualify for such autonomy, approval from the competent authority (e.g., the Ministry of Education and Training (MOET)) is required. A new training major may only be opened if it satisfies the prescribed conditions, such as requirements concerning faculty and facilities.

Meanwhile, under the Draft Law, the concept of “opening a training major” no longer exists. In particular, institutions must register their higher education activities, specifying the group of training majors (“nhóm ngành đào tạo” in Vietnamese) in which they intend to operate, and may only deliver training programs within the scope of such registered activities, except for certain special cases still requiring prior approval. Institutions are granted autonomy to design and issue their own training programs; however, these programs must be developed in accordance with the national training program standards issued by the minister of the MOET.

The objective of the Draft Law is to streamline and simplify administrative procedures by replacing the previous approval process for opening academic majors with a registration system for training programs. However, one outstanding issue in the Draft Law concerns the deadline for HEIs to complete the registration of their higher educational activities. The Draft Law neither provides a clear roadmap for registration nor specifies a transitional period for institutions that are lawfully operating under the previous “opening a training major” mechanism to adjust to the new framework. This gap may give rise to legal uncertainty, particularly regarding whether HEIs that have not yet completed the registration process may continue teaching and operating as usual, and whether any restrictions will apply to their activities during this transitional period. It is expected that, if the registration system for training programs is adopted, the MOET will issue detailed guidelines to avoid difficulties during this transitional period.

Academic Positions and Titles of Lecturers

The Law on Teachers, which was recently passed by the National Assembly in June 2025, stipulates that the titles of teachers are determined based on the professional requirements of each educational level and training qualification. However, it has not yet clearly defined the specific titles for lecturers. Therefore, the Draft Law has classified lecturers based on job positions and labor relations instead of administrative rank titles. Specifically, it categorizes lecturers into four types according to their labor relations: primary lecturers, co-primary lecturers, visiting lecturers, and post-retirement contract lecturers. Notably, the concepts of “co-primary lecturer” and “post-retirement contract lecturer” are entirely new in the Draft Law. In addition, for the first time, Draft Law formally recognizes the roles of teaching assistants and support staff, specifying their duties and employment conditions.

The Draft Law also redefines the titles of professor and associate professor as the highest academic honors, which may be held by lecturers in any employment category.

Branches of Foreign Higher Education Institutions in Vietnam

Under the Draft Law, branch campuses of foreign HEIs (FBCs) are to be established, organized, and operated in line with the regulations governing private HEIs established by foreign investors, subject to meeting prescribed operational conditions. In contrast to the current law, which focuses solely on regulating the “operation” of FBCs, the Draft Law broadens the framework by requiring compliance with rules on both “establishment” and “organization”, effectively placing FBCs under the same regime as foreign-invested private HEIs.

However, in essence, an FBC is an affiliated branch, under the comprehensive management of the foreign HEI that invested in establishing that branch. It remains under the control and management of its parent institution abroad, both in terms of academic program quality and governance structure. Applying the same requirements as those imposed on foreign-invested private HEIs for all three dimensions—establishment, organization, and operation—would create significant implementation challenges. Further, FBCs must not only comply with Vietnam’s educational regulations but also comply with the regulations and standards of the host country regarding the quality of educational institutions and educational programs. The fundamental differences between the two legal and educational systems could lead to many incompatible regulations, making it difficult for FBCs to harmonize the differences. Specifically, in cases where Vietnamese law and the parent institution’s regulations diverge on the same issue, it is unclear which framework an FBC would be required to follow.

Another critical challenge is the absence of a clearly defined legal status for FBCs in both the current law and the Draft Law. It is important to consider that FBCs are merely dependent units of their parent institutions, rather than independent entities. Therefore, it may not be necessary for FBCs to possess an independent legal personality. However, the absence of a clearly defined legal status for FBCs could create unnecessary complexity and overlap in the determination of rights, obligations, and civil liabilities between the FBC and its parent institution.

Outlook

The Law on Higher Education expanded the autonomy of higher education institutions, contributing to improved training quality, meeting workforce demands, and promoting the socialization of education in Vietnam. The amendments under the Draft Law make the law more suitable for practical realities, with a basis to overcome some overlaps in the legal framework, and in line with new development requirements in education.

This article was prepared with the assistance of Tilleke & Gibbins intern Hao Quoc Pham.

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