Thailand’s Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has issued a new regulation on material transactions (MTs) to govern asset acquisitions and disposals by listed companies and their subsidiaries. The new notification on MT criteria (No. TorJor. 45/2568) from the Capital Market Supervisory Board replaces the long-standing notification (No. TorJor. 20/2551) that has governed such matters. The SEC has also introduced parallel amendments to the country’s related-party transaction rules. The new regulation will take effect on July 1, 2026. Any MT matters approved by a company’s board of directors for shareholders’ approval before that date remain subject to Notification No. TorJor. 20/2551. Following that date, the new MT rules will introduce several significant changes that market participants should carefully consider. Expanded Scope of Material Transactions One of the key changes under the new regulation is the expansion of the definition of MTs, which now expressly covers financial assistance and certain lease and business lease arrangements that are not in the ordinary course of business of the listed company or its subsidiaries. For financial assistance, this includes lending, granting credit, providing guarantees, or entering into any arrangement that increases the company’s financial obligations, particularly where the recipient is facing liquidity issues or unable to repay debts. Other forms of financial support also fall within scope. However, whether the provision of collateral for others qualifies as an MT remains somewhat unclear, since no disposal of assets occurs for the provider of collateral. This issue remains to be carefully considered. For lease-related transactions, the MT rules now specifically include the lease or hire-purchase of all or part of a business or assets operated by or belonging to a listed company or its subsidiaries. New Exemptions The new regulation introduces clearer exemptions for transactions between a listed company and its subsidiaries or among subsidiaries, which

Data center and cloud investments are forming a major focus of private-sector investment in Thailand, with tech giants like Amazon, Google, Microsoft, and TikTok, as well as numerous telecom and data center companies, committing significant outlays to data center and cloud development. The country’s Board of Investment (BOI) approved projects worth THB 1.87 trillion in 2025, and THB 746 billion of this was from planned data center investments—by far the largest amount from any single industry. Thailand’s swift rise as a regional data center hub is fueled by surging demand for cloud, AI, and digital services, as well as large-scale investments from global tech firms. The country’s strategic location, competitive power costs, robust fiber infrastructure, expanding IT talent, and supportive government policies—including BOI incentives and streamlined approvals—have made it an attractive destination for scalable and sustainable digital infrastructure investments. The BOI’s proactive approach in updating promoted categories and providing both tax and non-tax incentives further ensures Thailand’s continued growth in this sector. 2025 BOI Changes for Data Centers In the middle of 2025, the BOI responded to the remarkable trend by updating investment‑promotion categories across various sectors (e.g., machinery and electrical equipment, public utilities, digital and innovative industries) to accommodate growing investment in data‑center projects. Before the change, which was detailed in a notification that has applied to investment promotion applications submitted from July 1, 2025, onward, data‑center projects under BOI promotion were granted a single A1 incentive (an eight‑year corporate income‑tax exemption) and subject to one uniform set of conditions. The July 2025 notification restructured promotion for data centers into two categories based on power‑usage efficiency: high‑efficiency data centers and other data centers. Under these rules, qualified high‑efficiency data centers are eligible for an eight‑year corporate income tax (CIT) exemption, while for other data centers this exemption is

When unauthorized credit card transactions occur, who bears responsibility—the cardholder or the issuing bank? In Thailand, a landmark 2025 ruling by the country’s Supreme Court has clarified this question, establishing a stricter standard for banks in fraud disputes and significantly strengthening consumer protections. The case centered on disputed charges where a customer claimed their credit card had been used without authorization. The bank sued to recover the amount, and both the court of first instance and the Court of Appeal ruled in favor of the bank. However, the Supreme Court overruled their judgments and decided that the customer did not need to pay for the unauthorized transactions, placing liability squarely on the bank. This ruling was based on three key findings, which are outlined below. Finding 1: Insufficient Expert Testimony In this case, the bank bore the burden of proving matters related to the credit card system’s manufacture, design, security, and operation, as required under the Consumer Case Procedure Act B.E. 2551 (2008). To meet this requirement, the bank presented testimony from two employees in its credit card department regarding ’security measures and issuance procedures. However, the Supreme Court found these witnesses unqualified as experts, as they did not present technical or academic evidence and did not possess specialized expertise in credit card technology. As a result, their testimony failed to establish that the bank’s credit card technology was sufficiently secure against fraudulent misuse. Finding 2: Contradictory Terms and Conditions The bank’s own credit card terms and conditions included a provision acknowledging that despite the card’s EMV security standards, cardholders must still exercise caution to prevent unauthorized access. The Supreme Court interpreted this clause as an explicit admission that credit card systems remain vulnerable to hacking and fraud, even with high-level security measures in place. This acknowledgment undermined the

On November 18, 2025, Vietnam’s Ministry of Finance released for public consultation a draft decree on administrative sanctions in the field of crypto assets and crypto asset markets (the “Draft Decree”), intended to implement Resolution No. 05/2025/NQ-CP dated September 9, 2025, on the pilot crypto asset market in Vietnam (“Resolution 05”). While Resolution 05 sets out who may participate and under what conditions, the Draft Decree addresses a more practical question for market participants, i.e., what happens if those conditions are not met. In doing so, the Draft Decree offers important insight into how Vietnamese regulators intend to supervise, discipline, and ultimately shape the crypto market during the pilot phase. Regulatory Scope and Overall Sanctions Architecture The Draft Decree applies to both domestic and foreign organizations and individuals engaging in crypto-related activities in Vietnam’s market. Covered entities include: (i) crypto asset issuers; (ii) crypto asset service providers, including trading platforms and market operators; (iii) Vietnamese and foreign investors participating in the pilot market; and (iv) other organizations involved in the offering, issuance, or provision of crypto-related services in Vietnam. The breadth of this scope is deliberate. It appears to reflect a regulatory view that cross-border structures, offshore platforms, and indirect participation may not necessarily insulate market actors from compliance obligations once they operate within the pilot framework. For the crypto industry, this may mark a shift from regulatory ambiguity toward a more explicit articulation of jurisdictional reach. At first glance, the Draft Decree’s monetary penalties appear restrained. The maximum fine per administrative violation is capped at VND 200 million (approx. USD 7,700) for organizations and VND 100 million (approx. USD 3,800) for individuals. However, focusing solely on fine levels risks missing the point. The Draft Decree also places great regulatory weight on supplementary sanctions and corrective measures, including: (i)