Arbitrator independence and impartiality form the cornerstone of a legitimate arbitral process. Under section 19 of the Thai Arbitration Act B.E. 2545 (2002), prospective arbitrators must disclose circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to their impartiality or independence, and existing arbitrators must do so throughout proceedings. This mirrors article 12 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. Yet despite this clear mandate, practical implementation varies significantly across Thailand’s arbitration landscape. Background Thailand’s two principal arbitration institutions, the Thai Arbitration Institute (TAI) and the Thailand Arbitration Center (THAC), both maintain procedures for addressing arbitrator challenges and require compliance with the statutory disclosure obligation. Under both sets of rules, any party wishing to challenge an arbitrator must submit a challenge application within fifteen days of becoming aware of the relevant facts, and a committee is appointed to consider the matter on a case-by-case basis. The TAI additionally prescribes its Code of Ethics and Conduct for Arbitrators to further emphasize the expectation of impartiality and transparency. However, Thailand’s arbitration ecosystem extends well beyond the TAI and THAC. Several sector-specific institutions also administer arbitral proceedings, including the Thai Commercial Arbitration Office under the Board of Trade of Thailand, the Arbitration Centre of the Office of the Insurance Commission, the Arbitration Centre of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Office for the Prevention and Resolution of Disputes regarding Intellectual Property, and the Arbitration Centre of the Thai General Insurance Association. These institutions each operate under their own procedural rules, which were developed to serve particular industries and dispute profiles. The procedural mechanisms for securing and documenting an independence declaration are not uniformly established across these forums. Consequences of Procedural Inconsistency This creates a notable gap. Not all arbitration bodies have a formalized procedure requiring written independence statements before proceedings commence. Some tribunals proceed

The president of Thailand’s Supreme Court has issued new recommendations providing courts with criminal jurisdiction with a comprehensive framework for identifying and dismissing criminal cases brought in bad faith. Published in the Government Gazette on May 29, 2026, after being signed on May 25, the Recommendations of the President of the Supreme Court Concerning Bad-Faith Litigation in Criminal Cases B.E. 2569 were issued under Section 5 of the Act on the Organization of Courts of Justice. The recommendations took effect upon publication and represent a significant step in Thailand’s efforts to curb abusive criminal litigation, including strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPP). Background Section 161/1 of Thailand’s Criminal Procedure Code empowers courts to dismiss criminal cases filed dishonestly or with the intent to harass or take unfair advantage of a defendant. The new recommendations provide detailed guidance that courts previously lacked on identifying and handling such prosecutions. Definition of Bad-Faith Litigation Under recommendation 1, filing a criminal case in bad faith is defined broadly to encompass three categories: Harassment-type filings involving intimidation, threats, or creating unreasonable hardship for the defendant; Coercive filings designed to pressure the defendant into acting or refraining from acting for illegitimate benefit; and False or misleading filings that deliberately assert incorrect material facts or conceal such facts. Circumstances Indicating Bad Faith Recommendation 2 sets out specific circumstances that should raise a court’s suspicion that a filing may violate section 161/1. These include: Filing in a distant court far from the defendant’s domicile without benefiting the adjudication; Retaliation against the defendant’s advocacy for human rights, environmental protection, consumer rights, labor rights, or other public interests—effectively establishing an express anti-SLAPP framework; Retaliation against whistleblowers who disclosed corruption or unlawful conduct; Retaliation against individuals responsible for investigating the plaintiff’s wrongdoing or who concluded such an investigation; Filing multiple

For multinational franchisors operating in Thailand, a key risk after franchise termination is that former outlets may continue operating in ways that could easily mislead consumers into believing they remain within the authorized network. To justify such operations, former franchisees often argue that the termination was invalid or ineffective. As a result, these cases are often treated as contractual disputes, making it difficult for franchisors to obtain injunctive relief before a final judgment confirms that the termination was lawful. Franchisors face significant commercial and reputational harm during lengthy proceedings, including consumer confusion, disruption to franchise restructuring, and damage to brand reputation and customer trust. In an encouraging development, the Thai court in a 2025 case responded to the problem of unauthorized post-termination franchise operations by granting interim relief, recognizing broader brand and consumer harm, and awarding substantial damages, highlighting a successful litigation strategy of framing the dispute not merely as a contractual termination issue but as trademark infringement causing ongoing commercial injury. The Subway Case From December 2024 to mid-2025, an unauthorized “Subway®” franchise operation in Thailand attracted substantial public and media attention. Reports and online discussions about unauthorized Subway® stores circulated widely after complaints arose about food quality and customer experience at certain outlets that were allegedly operating after their franchise rights had expired. Because these stores continued to use Subway® trademarks, trade dress, and overall commercial appearance, many consumers were unable to distinguish them from authorized operations, resulting in reputational risks and customer confusion that affected the franchisor’s brand and franchise system in Thailand. Subway treated this matter with the utmost seriousness and moved promptly to protect its brand, franchise system, and customers. It filed a civil action with the IP&IT Court seeking a permanent injunction and damages. During the proceedings, the court granted a preliminary injunction

Thailand published new rules on May 1, 2026, establishing clear procedures for how the Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO) handles digital assets seized during criminal and money laundering investigations. Taking effect the following day, the Regulation of the Anti-Money Laundering Board on the Custody and Management of Seized or Frozen Assets (No. 3) B.E. 2569 applies to digital asset businesses, cryptocurrency holders, and anyone subject to asset seizure under Thailand’s anti-money laundering laws. For the first time, authorities now have a detailed roadmap for transferring seized digital property from private or foreign control into secure state custody. Digital asset businesses holding customer assets under investigation must be prepared to comply with these rules compelling repatriation of such assets in enforcement actions. Expanded Definition of Digital Assets The regulation defines digital assets to include not only those covered by Thailand’s existing digital asset business law but also any other property that can be stored using the same methods as digital assets. This broad formulation means the custody rules will apply to emerging blockchain-based assets and tokenized property that may not yet fall within the statutory definition of a digital asset business, giving authorities flexibility as the technology evolves. Mandatory Transfer to Domestic Custody When digital assets are held with service providers outside Thailand, AMLO will first attempt to transfer them to an account the office maintains with a licensed domestic digital asset business operator. If the domestic operator does not support that particular asset, the office will instead move the assets to its own cold wallet (offline, internet-isolated storage system). If neither option is feasible, the seizing official will report the situation to the Anti-Money Laundering Committee for alternative instructions. A similar hierarchy governs assets held in an accused party’s private wallet or by any third party that is not a