On September 22, 2026, the Trade Competition Commission of Thailand (TCCT) opened a one-month public consultation period on proposed amendments to three key competition regulations, covering (1) the criteria for determining market dominance, (2) the definition of “monopoly” under Thailand’s premerger approval regime, and (3) the definition of a merger that may substantially lessen competition under Thailand’s postmerger notification regime. The public hearing period closes on October 21, 2026. The proposed changes could significantly affect merger filing obligations and the assessment of market dominance under the Trade Competition Act B.E. 2560 (2017) (TCA). The scope of the consultation and the proposed changes are outlined below. Market Dominance Criteria The draft notification on market dominance criteria proposes changes to the tests for both single-firm dominance and collective dominance, which would be measured using concentration ratios, as follows: Single-firm dominance: The proposed changes would lower the market-share threshold from 50% to 33% and the sales-turnover threshold from THB 1 billion to THB 500 million for the preceding year. Collective dominance: The three-firm concentration ratio (CR3) currently being used would be replaced by a two-firm concentration ratio (CR2). Under the new regime, the two largest operators in a relevant market would be considered dominant if their combined market share reached at least 75% in the preceding year. However, any business operator with sales turnover below THB 500 million or a market share below 10% would be excluded from this assessment. In addition to static or numerical thresholds, the proposed notification introduces a dynamic threshold or alternative criteria for assessing dominance in markets that change rapidly, experience short-term fluctuations in demand or supply, or use technology as a platform for conducting business, such as digital markets. Premerger and Postmerger Filing Thresholds Under the TCA, a premerger filing is required if a merger transaction

Vietnam is implementing and developing a broad package of regulatory reforms that could reshape how IP, data, digital platforms, and product authenticity are regulated and enforced. Several of the key measures have been led by the Ministry of Public Security in its legislative and administrative capacity, as part of a broader government effort. The core reform package consists of four key legal instruments: proposed amendments to the Criminal Code, a proposed new Data Security Law, a draft Decree on Product Identification, Authentication and Traceability, and the newly enacted Decree No. 330/2026/ND-CP. These instruments include rules on criminal enforcement, data security, electronic identification, product identification and traceability, administrative violations, and cybersecurity sanctions. Combined, these measures will affect copyright enforcement, industrial property rights, trade secrets, AI training data, product provenance, online takedowns, valuation of counterfeit goods and electronic evidence. It is worth noting that, in addition to strengthening criminal penalties for IP crimes, Vietnam’s emerging regulatory framework increasingly treats infringement, data misuse, product authentication, and platform-enabled violations as interconnected regulatory and enforcement challenges. For rights holders and foreign investors, this could mean stronger tools against counterfeiting and online infringement, but also more compliance obligations around data, traceability, AI, platform controls and government-facing reporting. Expansion of Criminal IP Enforcement Proposed amendments to Article 225 of the Criminal Code would expand criminal copyright exposure beyond reproduction and distribution to cover large-scale commercial public performance and online communication of works, phonograms and video recordings. This is important because piracy is increasingly about streaming, unauthorized communication, and platform access models rather than physical copying. Aggravated copyright infringement could be subject to up to 10 years in prison for individuals and fines of up to VND 6 billion (about USD 228,300) for commercial legal entities. The amended Article 226 would expand criminal industrial property liability beyond

Thailand’s first-to-file trademark system has a serious vulnerability: it lacks both an explicit mechanism for refusing bad-faith registrations and any means of invalidating them in court after the five-year limitation period has expired. While brand owners worldwide confront trademark squatting, Thailand’s statutory silence stands out, particularly in light of AIPPI’s 2017 Resolution Q249, which recommended that every jurisdiction provide clear tools to address bad faith at all stages of the trademark lifecycle. Nearly a decade later, Thailand has yet to act. This article proposes a concrete reform blueprint, drawing on the legislative models of China, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. The Statutory Gap Under the Thai Trademark Act B.E. 2534, no provision expressly authorizes examiners to reject an application on grounds of bad faith. Section 8(10) addresses well-known marks but offers no relief where the targeted mark lacks well-known status. Practitioners have resorted to Section 8(9)—which bars marks “contrary to public order, morality, or public policy”—as a workaround. However, this provision was designed to address the characteristics of the mark itself, not the applicant’s intent. Thai Supreme Court decisions have split on whether it can reach bad-faith conduct, creating persistent legal uncertainty. The gap extends beyond examination. Civil actions to cancel a bad-faith registration must be brought within five years—a deadline that frequently expires before foreign brand owners discover the squatted mark. Cancellation through the Board of Trademarks remains available but is slow, costly, and subject to court appeal, leaving bad-faith registrations in force during protracted proceedings. The system effectively rewards squatters and penalizes legitimate owners. Lessons from International Best Practices Several major jurisdictions have already closed this gap. China’s 2019 amendment to Article 4 of the Trademark Law introduced an absolute ground for refusal: “bad faith trademark applications without intent to use shall be rejected.” Bad

In August 2026, Vietnam’s Ministry of Industry and Trade released a draft decree to replace Decree No. 35/2020/ND-CP detailing certain articles of the Competition Law (Decree 35). The key changes under the draft decree and their implications for M&A transactions in Vietnam are summarized below. Definition of “Management Body” Decree 35 uses the term “management body” (bộ phận điều hành) as one of the criteria to determine the group of affiliated enterprises for the purpose of merger filing. However, there is no definition of the term, leaving enterprises without a basis on which to apply it consistently. The draft decree introduces a statutory definition of “management body,” being a person or group of persons who (i) own more than 50% of charter capital or voting shares; (ii) hold ownership or use rights over more than 50% of an enterprise’s assets; (iii) are an enterprise manager under enterprise law; or (iv) have decision-making power over the enterprise’s resolutions, daily business operations, or business and investment plans. This helps enterprises better assess the scope of merger filing. Determination of Relevant Product Market Under Decree 35, the relevant product market is defined solely by reference to goods and services interchangeable in characteristics, intended use, and price without accommodating digital or zero-price products. The draft decree expands the relevant product market to include “products” (sản phẩm) in addition to traditional “goods and services,” which captures digital information products, AI products, and other novel offerings. Additionally, it adds “other relevant competitive factors” such as quality of products, goods, and services for determining the relevant product market, supplementing the existing factors of characteristics, intended use, and price. This addresses cases where price substitutability is not meaningful for certain consumers or users, i.e., zero-price products. Determination of Relevant Geographic Market Under Decree 35, only physical geographic