You are using an outdated browser and your browsing experience will not be optimal. Please update to the latest version of Microsoft Edge, Google Chrome or Mozilla Firefox. Install Microsoft Edge

April 23, 2026

Draft Decree Marks a Key Milestone in Vietnam’s Emerging Blockchain Legal Framework

Vietnam has progressively positioned blockchain as a strategic technology within its broader digital transformation agenda over the past decade. From early policy orientations to more recent legislative developments, the regulatory approach has gradually shifted from high-level recognition to more concrete legal integration. Against this backdrop, a new draft decree regulating activities relating to product and goods identification, authentication, and traceability (the “Draft Decree”) marks a notable turning point.

Rather than merely referencing blockchain as a policy priority, the Draft Decree incorporates blockchain directly into a nationwide regulatory system, positioning it as part of the underlying infrastructure for data governance and public administration in relation to the management, verification, and traceability of product-related data.

Evolution of Vietnam’s Blockchain Legal Framework: The Draft Decree in Context

Vietnam’s blockchain legal framework has developed in several distinct phases. The first phase, beginning around 2019, was characterized by high-level policy recognition in several resolutions of the Party Central Committee. Particularly, blockchain was identified as part of the broader category of digital technologies critical to industrial modernization and participation in the Fourth Industrial Revolution. These resolutions did not regulate blockchain directly, but established its strategic importance at the national level.

The second phase (2023 to 2025) saw the introduction of national strategies and technology policies that more explicitly recognized blockchain as a priority technology. Those policies collectively signaled a clear policy commitment to developing blockchain infrastructure and applications. However, these instruments remained largely at a policy-level and did not establish binding regulatory frameworks.

The third phase (from 2025) involves the gradual integration of blockchain into sectoral legislation. Laws such as the Law on Digital Technology Industry (2025), the Law on Personal Data Protection (2025), and the Law on Science, Technology, and Innovation (2025) have introduced concepts such as digital assets, crypto assets, and even specific provisions relating to blockchain (e.g., personal data protection in blockchain systems). At the same time, regulatory frameworks for international financial centers and different sandbox regimes have begun to create controlled environments for blockchain-based business models.

Within this evolving landscape, the Draft Decree represents a transition to a potential new phase: the operationalization of blockchain within a concrete regulatory system. Unlike previous instruments, it does not merely recognize or encourage blockchain. Instead, it embeds the use of blockchain within a national infrastructure for product identification, authentication, and traceability. In this sense, the Draft Decree occupies a unique position within Vietnam’s legal framework, serving as one of the first instruments to translate blockchain policy into enforceable regulatory architecture.

Blockchain Architecture for Product Identification, Authentication, and Traceability

On its face, the Draft Decree is a sector-specific instrument aimed at standardizing identification, authentication, and traceability requirements for products and goods. However, it reflects a broader regulatory objective: the establishment of a blockchain-based national digital infrastructure for the identification, authentication, and traceability of product-related data. The Draft Decree places these functions within an integrated ecosystem comprising a national platform, a national database, and data-sharing mechanisms.

A key structural feature is the introduction of a two-layer system. The National Blockchain Platform functions as the infrastructure layer responsible for recording, verifying, and ensuring the integrity of product data, while the National Platform for Identification, Authentication, and Traceability operates as the application layer built on top of that infrastructure. The latter manages operational processes such as product identification, certification, and lifecycle tracking, while relying on the blockchain layer to ensure trust and verifiability of data.

This layered architecture is significant because it positions blockchain as a foundational “trust layer” rather than a peripheral technology. Moreover, the National Blockchain Platform is designed as a shared infrastructure capable of supporting multiple systems requiring data authentication, suggesting that traceability is only the first use case in a broader national strategy for blockchain deployment. As such, the Draft Decree goes beyond regulating traceability and instead establishes the technological and regulatory groundwork for future blockchain-based systems.

UID, DID, and Blockchain-Based Verification

The Draft Decree introduces a structured traceability mechanism based on two distinct but interrelated identifiers. Each product is assigned a unique identifier (UID), which serves as the anchor linking all data generated throughout its lifecycle. The UID can be understood as the product’s “digital passport”, consolidating information such as origin, certifications, and supply chain events into a single reference point.

At the same time, each participating entity is assigned a decentralized identifier (DID), created on the National Blockchain Platform and linked to its electronic identity. The DID functions as a blockchain-based identity, enabling entities to digitally sign data, issue certificates, and participate in verification processes.

The use of both UID and DID reflects a deliberate separation between the product and the actor. The UID identifies the object being tracked, while the DID identifies the entity responsible for generating or verifying data. This dual-identifier system enables both traceability and accountability since every piece of data can be linked not only to a product, but also to a verifiable identity. Within this framework, blockchain acts as the infrastructure layer that records data immutably, links it to verified identities, and enables verification through cryptographic mechanisms.

Legal Recognition of Blockchain-Based Data and Integration with Existing Frameworks

The Draft Decree recognizes the legal validity of digital data where such data is properly created and authenticated in accordance with prescribed procedures. Digital certificates associated with products are accorded the same validity as originals, and data authenticated through the system may, in certain circumstances, be treated as equivalent to source data stored in national or specialized databases.

This recognition is particularly important because it bridges blockchain-based systems with existing legal frameworks. It aligns with the Law on Electronic Transactions and regulations on digital signatures and trust services, which recognize electronically authenticated data, while also supporting the implementation of traceability requirements under the Law on Product and Goods Quality. At the same time, the Draft Decree integrates with the broader data governance regime under the Law on Data, including national databases and data-sharing mechanisms, thereby ensuring interoperability across systems.

In this sense, the Draft Decree brings together multiple legal regimes, from product quality, electronic transactions, to data protection, by integrating them into a single, blockchain-enabled system.

Outlook

Taken as a whole, the Draft Decree signals a shift from policy-level recognition of blockchain to its practical implementation. The focus on product identification, authentication, and traceability as the first use case reflects both immediate regulatory needs and the suitability of blockchain for managing data generated across multiple parties and stages in the supply chain.

More importantly, the architecture introduced by the Draft Decree has broader implications beyond traceability. The combination of DID, UID, digital certificates, and blockchain-based verification mechanisms creates a modular framework that could be extended to other sectors, including digital identity, asset registries, financial services, and public administration, to name a few. This suggests that the Draft Decree is not merely a sector-specific regulation, but a foundational step toward a broader blockchain-enabled regulatory ecosystem.

For businesses, this development presents both opportunities and constraints. While it opens up demand for enterprise blockchain solutions, digital identity infrastructure, and data authentication services, it also signals a regulatory preference for state-led, permissioned blockchain models integrated with national infrastructure. As a result, it seems that at this phase, blockchain businesses operating in Vietnam may need to align with government systems and compliance frameworks, rather than relying on fully decentralized or permissionless models.

RELATED INSIGHTS​ 

August 4, 2026
Thailand’s Personal Data Protection Act B.E. 2562 (2019) (PDPA) could soon see some important changes, as a draft bill to amend the PDPA has been introduced in the House of Representatives. The draft amendment is currently in the public consultation phase, with comments accepted from July 16 to August 15, 2026. If enacted in its current form, the amendment would make three key changes: expanding the government exemption to cover anticorruption operations, introducing a statutory definition of “government agency,” and restructuring the lawful bases for personal data processing to align with international standards. Background The PDPA has encountered several enforcement challenges since its implementation, including three core problems identified by the bill’s sponsors: (1) the current exemptions for government agencies do not cover anticorruption and misconduct-prevention operations; (2) the PDPA lacks a clear statutory definition of “government agency,” causing legal uncertainty as to which entities are covered; and (3) the existing framework for lawful bases of data processing does not align with international standards—particularly the multiple-lawful-bases system in the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)—making compliance inflexible for both government and private sector entities. Expanded Government Exemption The current PDPA exempts government agencies performing duties related to national security (including fiscal security), public safety, anti-money laundering, forensic science, and cybersecurity. The proposed amendment adds “prevention and suppression of corruption and misconduct” to this list of exempted functions. This would allow anticorruption bodies—most notably the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC), which is identified as a directly affected party—to collect, use, and disclose personal data without being subject to PDPA requirements when carrying out their duties. New Statutory Definition of “Government Agency” Notably, while the current PDPA use the term “government agency” in several provisions, the term is not comprehensively defined, creating potential uncertainty as to its scope. The draft bill therefore
August 4, 2026
Tilleke & Gibbins has contributed the Vietnam chapter to Fintech 2027, a global guide published by Lexology Panoramic that provides comparative insights into the legal and regulatory frameworks governing fintech businesses across multiple jurisdictions. The Vietnam chapter offers a comprehensive overview of the country’s rapidly evolving fintech landscape, examining both the regulatory environment and practical considerations for businesses operating in or entering the Vietnamese market. Topics covered include: Fintech landscape and initiatives: General innovation climate; government and regulatory support Financial regulation: Regulatory bodies; regulated activities; consumer lending; secondary market loan trading; collective investment schemes; alternative investment funds; peer-to-peer and marketplace lending; crowdfunding; invoice trading; payment services; open banking; robo-advice; insurance products; credit references Cross-border regulation: Passporting; requirement for a local presence Sales and marketing: Restrictions on the promotion and marketing of financial products and services Cryptoassets and tokens: Distributed ledger technology; cryptoassets; token issuance Artificial intelligence: Regulatory framework governing AI systems and AI-enabled financial services Change of control: Notification and consent requirements for regulated businesses Financial crime: Anti-bribery and anti-money laundering procedures; regulatory guidance Data protection and cybersecurity: Data protection obligations; cybersecurity requirements applicable to fintech businesses Outsourcing and cloud computing: Outsourcing of material functions; use of cloud computing in the financial services industry Intellectual property rights: IP protection for software; employee- and contractor-created IP; joint ownership; trade secrets; branding; remedies for infringement Competition: Competition law issues affecting fintech businesses Tax: Incentives for innovation and investment; developments affecting tax and compliance obligations Immigration: Immigration options for recruiting skilled foreign personnel; special measures available through Vietnam’s international financial centers The chapter also examines a number of significant recent developments shaping Vietnam’s fintech sector, including the introduction of the country’s first comprehensive regulatory framework for cryptoassets, the adoption of a dedicated law on artificial intelligence, implementation of the banking regulatory sandbox,
August 3, 2026
On July 23, 2026, the Bank of Thailand (BOT) released for public comment its draft Notification on Digital Channel Security, which would significantly expand the scope and stringency of Thailand’s existing mobile banking security framework. If finalized in its current form, the draft notification would extend mandatory security requirements to credit card providers and credit providers, cover internet banking in addition to mobile applications, phase out SMS one-time passwords (OTPs) for transaction authentication, and introduce biometric verification requirements for high-value transactions. The public comment period is open through August 24, 2026. Background The BOT’s existing Mobile Banking Security Notification, issued in 2024, sets minimum security standards for financial institutions, specialized financial institutions (SFIs), and e-money providers, significantly reducing “money-draining app” fraud. However, fraudsters have since shifted to nonbank providers and internet banking channels, prompting the BOT to propose broader security requirements. Expanded Scope of Regulated Entities and Channels The existing Mobile Banking Security Notification covers only financial institutions, SFIs, and e-money providers offering mobile banking services. The draft expands coverage in two key areas: entities and channels. On the entity side, it adds credit card providers and credit providers that offer fund transfers to third parties at other financial service providers or that provide cash withdrawal services to individual retail customers. On the channel side, it broadens coverage to include internet banking in addition to mobile banking. Strengthened Customer Authentication The draft introduces enhanced authentication requirements in three areas: Service enrollment and device changes. Providers must implement rigorous identity verification, notify customers of enrollment results through out-of-band communication channels, and adopt risk-mitigation measures such as cooling-off periods and temporary transaction limits. Transaction-level authentication. Providers must use two-factor authentication for fund transfers, cardless ATM withdrawals, and transaction limit increases. Secure authentication factors. Key requirements include the following: “What-you-know” factors must
July 28, 2026
Data protection officers (DPOs) have become a fixture of Thailand’s privacy compliance landscape since the Personal Data Protection Act B.E. 2562 (2019) (PDPA) took full effect and the Office of the Personal Data Protection Committee (PDPC) began requiring certain organizations to appoint them. On July 7, 2026, the Office of the PDPC presented draft guidance on DPOs as part of a public consultation on a series of draft personal data protection manuals and recommendations. The draft offers the clearest indication yet of how the regulator expects the DPO role to work in practice, addressing recurring implementation issues under the PDPA—including when an organization must appoint a DPO, how the DPO should operate independently, how to manage conflicts of interest, and how data subjects and regulators should be able to contact the DPO. Because it remains in draft, organizations have an opportunity to weigh the practical implications now before the guidance is finalized. When a DPO Must Be Appointed The draft guidance clarifies the triggers for mandatory DPO appointment, including: Regular and systematic monitoring of personal data or systems on a large scale, such as tracking, analyzing, or predicting behavior, attitudes, or individual characteristics. Core activities involving large-scale processing of sensitive personal data, such as health data, biometric data, or criminal records. Certain foreign-organization representative arrangements. Public-sector coverage under relevant notifications identifying government entities that must appoint a DPO. Processing involving 100,000 or more data subjects may be considered large-scale. The guidance also contemplates voluntary DPO appointment for organizations that wish to raise their privacy governance standards, and such organizations should still comply with the standards applicable to DPOs under the law. Independence and Reporting Lines The draft guidance identifies lack of DPO independence as a core risk because an ineffective or constrained DPO may be unable to raise deficiencies